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ABSTRACT

ESTIMATING THE DYNAMIC SENSITIVE CROSS SECTION OF
AN FPGA DESIGN THROUGH FAULT INJECTION

D. Eric Johnson
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Master of Science

A fault injection tool has been created to emulate single event upset (SEU)
behavior within the configuration memory of an FPGA. This tool is able to rapidly
and accurately determine the dynamic sensitive cross section of the configuration
memory for a given FPGA design. This tool enables the reliability of FPGA designs
and fault tolerance schemes to be quickly and accurately tested.
The validity of testing performed with this fault injection tool has been confirmed through radiation testing. A radiation test was conducted at Crocker Nuclear
Laboratory using a proton accelerator in order to determine the actual dynamic sensitive cross section for specific FPGA designs. The results of this radiation testing were
then analyzed and compared with similar fault injection tests, with results suggesting
that the fault injection tool behavior is indeed accurate and valid.
The fault injection tool can be used to determine the sensitivity of an FPGA
design to configuration memory upsets. Additionally, fault mitigation techniques
designed to increase the reliability of an FPGA design in spite of upsets within the
configuration memory, can be thoroughly tested through fault injection.

Fault injection testing should help to increase the feasibility of reconfigurable
computing in space. FPGAs are well suited to the computational demands of space
based signal processing applications; however, without appropriate mitigation or redundancy techniques, FPGAs are unreliable in a radiation environment. Because
the fault injection tool has been shown to reliably model the effects of single event
upsets within the configuration memory, it can be used to accurately evaluate the
effectiveness of fault tolerance techniques in FPGAs.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are becoming more and more
prominent as they continue to fill the gap between the flexibility provided by microprocessors and the performance of custom ASIC designs. The unique blend of
flexibility and performance offered by FPGAs is the reason behind their recent popularity in custom computing applications.
The flexibility and performance capabilities provided by FPGAs has been the
cause for an increasing interest in using SRAM-based FPGAs in space-based applications, such as remote sensing[2],[3]. Because they are reprogrammable, FPGAs can
be used to achieve multiple objectives on the same mission by sharing the FPGA
fabric amongst various FPGA designs through time-multiplexing. Whenever a different mission objective needs to be fulfilled, the FPGA can be programmed with a
new design. The reprogrammable nature of FPGAs also allows for design errors to
be corrected in the field, after a system has been deployed.
However, the reconfigurable capabilities of an FPGA also hinder the reliability
of FPGAs in a radiation environment common to space-based missions. SRAM-based
FPGAs make use of a configuration memory to store the configuration of the currently
operating design. The latches of this configuration memory are sensitive to single
event upsets (SEUs) often caused by cosmic radiation effects. An upset within the
configuration memory of an FPGA can actually change the currently programmed
design, potentially altering the expected design behavior.
In order for FPGAs to become a solution for the problem of reconfigurable
computing in space, an investigation into methods for FPGA reliability needs to be
1

conducted. More specifically, a testbed needs to be developed in order to facilitate
the testing of various reliability techniques. Although ground-based radiation testing
can be used to determine the run-time characteristics and reliability of a particular
FPGA design in a radiation environment, such testing is expensive and slow to produce conclusive results. However, some method for testing the reliability of FPGA
mitigation techniques and FPGA designs is essential.
Fault injection is one method for modeling the effects of SEUs within an FPGA
design. Fault injection can be used to provide fast, cheap, accurate and targeted
testing of FPGA designs. By utilizing fault injection, various mitigation techniques
can be devised and tested quickly and thoroughly, without the need of radiation
testing. This thesis describes an FPGA-based fault injection tool which allows fast,
exhaustive and accurate testing of FPGA designs, and which has been validated
through close comparison with results obtained through radiation-based testing. This
fault injection tool allows FPGA designers to validate the performance of any SEU
mitigation techniques and to determine the overall sensitivity of an FPGA design to
SEUs. This fault injection tool a variety of iterations of mitigation techniques can be
tried and tested before using cumbersome radiation techniques, thus speeding up the
design verification cycle.
This thesis begins with a discussion of radiation effects in FPGAs. Next,
various techniques for fault modeling are introduced, and the benefits of a fault injection approach are discussed. An architecture for FPGA fault injection based on the
SLAAC-1V board is presented, along with initial fault injection results for a variety
of FPGA designs. Finally, a comparison between radiation testing and fault injection
testing is made, showing the validity of fault injection results.

2

Chapter 2

Radiation Effects on SRAM-based FPGAs

Like all CMOS semiconductor devices, SRAM-based FPGAs are susceptible
to the effects of radiation common to an earth orbit. In particular, they are especially
sensitive to single event effects (SEE). In order to successfully use them in a space
environment, a proper understanding of radiation effects in FPGAs is necessary, enabling proper radiation mitigation techniques to be developed and applied to FPGA
designs.
This chapter will discuss several radiation effects, including total ionizing dose,
single event latchup, single event transients and single event upsets. These radiation
effects will be discussed specifically in regards to their relation to FPGAs. Finally, a
discussion of radiation mitigation techniques specific for FPGAs will be presented.

Heavy Ion

−− +
+ +−
−
+ +
−
−
− +
+ −

Figure 2.1: Heavy ion interacting with a transistor.
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2.1

Radiation Effects
Most radiation effects within electronic devices are made manifest due to in-

teractions with high energy protons and cosmic rays. These interactions typically
result in the formation of an electric charge within the device. Cosmic rays, or heavy
ions, cause this charge formation directly, as in Figure 2. However, interaction with
protons usually results in a charge formation through an indirect manner, as in Figure 2.1; the proton collides with the nucleus of another particle in a nuclear reaction
referred to as spallation. As a result of this collision, particles are emitted from the
target nucleus, which particles may subsequently create a charge buildup within the
device[4]. Four specific effects caused by this charge buildup will be discussed in the
following subsections.

Proton

+ −+ − +−
− − +−+ − −+
+
++
−
− ++−
+ −
−+

Figure 2.2: Proton interacting with a transistor.

2.1.1

Total Ionizing Dose
Total ionizing dose relates to how much ionization or charge that a given

electronic device can tolerate before it becomes inoperable. As already discussed,
radiation effects may result in a charge buildup within an electronic device. This
charge equates to an increase in the accumulated ionizing dose for the affected device.
Total ionizing dose effects cannot be undone; these effects are permanent.

4

As this charge builds up within an electronic device, the operation of transistors can be affected. This charge buildup can affect a threshold voltage shift within
a transistor. As the threshold voltage shifts, so also does the leakage current within
that transistor. This can be particularly disastrous as the total dose increases, corresponding to an increase in the leakage current. This increased leakage current can
potentially damage the device.
The effects of charge buildup can also affect the operation of parasitic transistors. Similar to the way in which ionization affects the nominal transistors within a
device, the leakage current within a parasitic transistor may also increase with charge
buildup. This is actually interdevice leakage current, which also can ultimately destroy the electronic device.
2.1.2

Single Event Latchup
Single event latchup occurs when parasitic transistors are activated by the

ionization effects caused by radiation. The activation of these parasitic transistors
causes switching activity within the designer-intended transistors. This in turn leads
to large parasitic current flow. When this parasitic current flow is large, the device
can potentially be damaged.
Current monitoring hardware can be used to prevent permanent damage due
to single event latchup. Power to the device can be cut off whenever the total device
current rises above a certain threshold, thus preventing permanent damage to the
device.
The effects of single event latchup are not permanent as long as the device
has not been damaged. Once the device is power cycled, the operation of affected
transistors returns to normal.
2.1.3

Single Event Transients
Occasionally local ionization effects due to radiation may cause a transient

current or voltage spike on digital signals. These transient effects do not directly
cause damage to a device.
5
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SET

2

SET

Q

Incorrect output
Figure 2.3: Single event transients.

In general, these transients do not cause error conditions within a digital system. In clocked systems, however, an incorrect value may be stored into a memory
element if the transient occurs at such a point in time that it is latched into that
element. Figure 2.1.3 better illustrates this point. This figure shows a flip-flop with
input data always set to zero. The single event transient at time 1 is not latched
into the flip-flop because it does not occur with the rising clock edge. However, the
single event transient at time 2 does occur with the clock edge and is latched into
the flip-flop. For the input data shown, the flip-flop gives an incorrect value for one
cycle.
In the sense that single event transients can modify the contents of a memory
element, SETs appear identical to the effects of single event upsets, which will be
discussed more in the next subsection. The only real distinguishing feature between
the two is that the observable effects of single event transients increase with clock
rate. Consequently, given the radiation characteristics of a particular environment,
the clock rate of a given system may have to be lowered in order to meet timing
constraints on average.
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2.1.4

Single Event Upsets
Sometimes charge effects due to radiation interact with the state of latch struc-

tures within a device. This charge can potentially alter the state of a memory element,
such as a flip-flop. Such an incident is referred to as a single event upset, or SEU.
The effects of SEUs can be much less damaging in nature than those related
to total dose or single event latchup. SEU effects are not permanent in nature. The
incorrect state in a memory element will remain only until it is overwritten or flushed
out. SEU effects do not necessarily cause damage to a device. Potential damage
may occur when the state of a memory element is controlling the drive strength of a
signal, for example. In general, however, the effects of SEUs do not cause permanent
damage.
2.2

Radiation Effects in Modern SRAM-based FPGAs
Radiation effects have more specific consequences when interacting with SRAM-

based FPGAs. The most critical of these effects are due to the configuration memory
of an FPGA. These effects are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.
2.2.1

Total Ionizing Dose and Single Event Latchup
Total ionizing dose and single event latchup effects affect FPGAs just as they

do any other digital electronic device. However, these effects can be lessened and
successfully managed, preventing total ionizing dose and single event latchup from
hindering functional operation in a radiation environment.
Several orthogonal solutions individually contribute to the total ionizing dose
and single event latchup tolerance of modern FPGAs. The smaller feature size present
in modern VLSI processes improves total dose and latchup tolerance[5],[6], although
it may potentially increase single event upset sensitivity in memory structures. The
addition of an epitaxial layer in the integrated circuit manufacturing process also
serves to increase total dose and latchup immunity. Finally, alternate cell geometries
help with immunity as well.
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In order to successfully use modern FPGAs in a known radiation environment,
the expected total ionizing dose for an entire mission is estimated. A part which is
tolerant up to the specified dosage is chosen. This process applies equally to mitigation
of single event latchup effects. In general, total ionizing dose and single event latchup
are solved problems in relation to operating FPGAs in a known radiation environment.
2.2.2

Single Event Upsets and Transients
SRAM-based FPGAs are particularly sensitive to the effects of single event

upsets and single event transients. In FPGAs, SEUs and SETs can affect the state of
flip-flops, user memory structures such as RAMs, as well as the configuration memory.
Upsets within flip-flops and user memories are not particular only to FPGAs;
these problems also exist within ASIC designs. However, upsets within the configuration memory is a problem unique to SRAM-based FPGAs. Upsets occurring within
the configuration memory can have potentially drastic consequences for an FPGA
design. These consequences can be best illustrated through example.
Figure 2.2.2 illustrates an possible programmable block within a contrived
FPGA architecture. An FPGA would be made up of an array of such programmable
blocks with programmable routing connections available for block interconnections.
This particular programmable block is comprised of a look up table, which in this
case can be used to implement any arbitrary 4-input logic function, a flip-flop and a
configuration mux. The configuration mux is not a mux that can be accessed by the
user design to dynamically select between the output of the look up table and the
flip-flop; it is programmed at configuration time and statically selects between the
output of these two components.
The configuration memory of an FPGA defines the currently programmed
FPGA design. The configuration of all programmable blocks and the interconnections
between them are determined by the state of the configuration memory, as illustrated
in Figure 2.2.2. This figure shows that the contents of the look up table are such that
they define a 4-input AND gate. Also, the the routing mux is programmed so that
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Figure 2.4: Programmable block within a possible realization of an FPGA architecture.

it statically selects the output of the flip-flop, meaning that the result of the 4-input
AND gate is latched into the flip-flop before leaving the programmable block.
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Figure 2.5: The configuration memory of an FPGA defines the operation of a programmable block.

Problems arise when the state of the configuration memory is altered, for example by an SEU. An SEU has the potential to change the state of the configuration
memory; such an occurrence is known as a configuration memory upset. A configuration memory upset may alter the logical operation of the programmable block, as
shown in Figure 2.2.2, or the configuration of routing within the FPGA by changing
the contents of routing muxes, as shown in Figure 2.2.2. In either of these examples,
the actual FPGA design is modified, resulting in different design behavior.
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Figure 2.6: A configuration memory upset within the look up table alters the logical
function of the programmable block.
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Figure 2.7: A configuration memory can alter the interconnection within the programmable block.

2.3

Fault Mitigation Techniques for FPGAs
With such sensitivity to SEUs, SRAM-based FPGAs without any additional

design modifications are generally unsuited to operation in a radiation environment.
In general, incorrect design behavior is undesirable, and for critical applications, it
is absolutely unacceptable. In order to make FPGAs a more feasible solution for
operation in a radiation environment mitigation techniques are necessary.
2.3.1

Flip-Flop and User Memory Mitigation
As already discussed, upsets affecting the state of flip-flops or user memory

structures are not unique to FPGA designs; these problems affect ASIC designs as
10

well. Upsets within these memory elements can be introduced through means other
than just upsets directly in the memory elements themselves; they can occur as the
indirect result of an incorrect input value caused by a single event transient being
latched into a memory element. Additionally, configuration memory upsets resulting
in incorrect design behavior can be another cause of incorrect values being latched
into memory elements.
Faults occurring within flip-flops and user memory structures can be mitigated against through error-detection-and-correction (EDAC) coding[7]. EDAC codes
should protect against upsets occurring within the memory structures themselves as
well as against incorrect values being latched into the memory devices, as long as no
more upsets occur than the EDAC code is capable of correcting.
Circuit redundancy is another technique for mitigating against upsets within
memory structures. One form of circuit redundancy is triple module redundancy(TMR)[8],
which provides redundancy by triplicating design modules and voting on the output of
the modules, as in Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.1. In the case of upsets occurring directly in
the memory structures, the upsets will be corrected when the contents of the memory
are used as long as no more than one upset amongst the three modules has occurred.
In the case of incorrect values being latched into memory structures, triple
module redundancy must be applied to all sections of the circuit which feed the input
of a given memory device. Any single point of failure may result in an incorrect value
being latched into all of the triplicated memory modules. This is better illustrated
in Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.1. In Figure 2.3.1, an incorrect value can be latched into
the triplicated flip-flop structure, and will not be able to be corrected by the voter.
However, in Figure 2.3.1, any single incorrect value can be corrected by means of the
voter.
2.3.2

Configuration Memory Mitigation
Two main techniques are needed to mitigate against the effects of configuration

memory upsets in an SRAM-based FPGA. These two techniques are orthogonal in
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Figure 2.8: A triple module redundancy scheme which still has a single point of
failure.

the way that they prevent errors, but are both necessary in order to provide correct
circuit operation in a radiation environment.
Triple module redundancy with voting[8] ensures correct design behavior when
a single configuration upset occurs. As a configuration memory upset may actually
modify an FPGA design, this redundancy is necessary to guarantee correct design
behavior. As long as two of the triplicated modules perform the correct function, the
correct result will be obtained through the use of voters. However, redundancy techniques are only useful when the number of configuration memory upsets are limited.
In the case of triple module redundancy only one configuration memory upset may
be allowed at a time in order to guarantee error correction.
In order to reduce the number of upsets present in the configuration memory at
a single point in time, bitstream scrubbing can be used[9]. This technique consists of
periodically refreshing the contents of the entire configuration memory of the FPGA.
Alternately, the contents of the configuration memory can be periodically read and
those sections containing errors can be corrected. Although this technique cannot
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Figure 2.9: A triple module redundancy scheme with no single point of failure.

guarantee that the design will be 100% free of all configuration memory upsets, it
can reduce the number upsets present at any given time within the configuration
memory. The likelihood that no more than one upset will be present at any given
time depends on how often the entire configuration memory is scrubbed, and this
probability increases as this scrub period decreases.
Neither technique can provide error free design operation of its own accord.
However, the use of triple module redundancy and configuration memory scrubbing
together greatly increases the reliability of an FPGA design. It is important to
note that the reliability of a system utilizing these two techniques in a radiation
environment can never reach 100%, though for all practical purposes it can approach
it to such a degree that the likelihood of a observing failure is so miniscule as to make
it tolerable for certain types of systems.
2.4

Conclusion
Though computationally well-suited to the demands of space-based applica-

tions, FPGAs are susceptible to radiation effects common in a space environment.
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Some of these effects have been overcome through changes in the VLSI process used
to manufacture the FPGA; others, such as single event upsets, can be overcome
through design level mitigation techniques.
In order to better understand the necessary measures to mitigate FPGA design
against the effects of single event upsets, mitigation techniques need to be tested.
Radiation testing is typically cumbersome and slow to produce results for dynamic
design testing. Consequently, it is necessary to model the effects of single event upsets
caused by radiation within the configuration memory of FPGAs.
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Chapter 3

Fault Modeling

Fault modeling is a common technique for determining the behavior of systems
prone to faulty conditions. Digital systems are often tested using fault modeling techniques in order to ensure their correct operation under a variety of conditions[10],[11].
As described in the previous section, radiation effects in particular can cause error
conditions in SRAM-based FPGAs. Consequently, much work has been invested in
developing modeling techniques to accurately model the behavior of FPGAs in an
environment prone to causing faults.
Of especial importance to SRAM-based FPGAs is the ability to model the
interaction of single event upsets with the behavior of the currently programmed
FPGA design. As described in the previous chapter, it is largely this sensitive cross
section which prohibits SRAM-based FPGAs from being used reliably in space. With
a model capable of identifying the dynamic sensitive cross section for a given FPGA
design, critical design sections can be identified and appropriate mitigation techniques
applied. It is important that a model for identifying the dynamic sensitive cross
section of an FPGA be fast and accurate, in order to enable realistic evaluation of
fault mitigation techniques and preparation of FPGA designs for a space environment.
This chapter presents several methods for fault modeling, with an emphasis
on fault simulation and fault injection. The strengths and weaknesses of the various
approaches along with how each relates to identifying the dynamic sensitive cross
section of a particular FPGA design is discussed.
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3.1

Overview
In electronic systems, a fault is a failure that can potentially result in the man-

ifestation of an error[12]. Faults can be caused for a variety of reasons. Fabrication
defects may yield a system inoperable from the beginning, or may make it more likely
to fail with time. Device failures may occur with age, overuse, or physical damage.
Additionally, environmental factors such as temperature, humidity, and radiation can
cause faults within an electronic device. Radiation induced faults are by far the most
critical when dealing with operating an SRAM-based FPGA in a space environment.
In certain operating environments, faults can be a significant effect contributing to the reliability of operation of a given device. The occurrence of faults within a
device are often random in nature. Because of their potential consequences, the effects
of faults must be taken into account when designing a system. Both the detection
and prevention of upsets can be simplified through fault modeling. Such is especially
the case for SRAM-based FPGAs operating in a radiation environment. Though the
occurrence of upsets within the configuration memory may be both rare and random
in nature, the effects of these upsets are potentially drastic enough to validate further investigation into mitigation techniques. With an accurate and reliable model of
these effects, such an investigation can be practically conducted.
Fault modeling consists of creating a model of a system, either physical or
simulated, and inserting faults or causing faulty behavior within that system in order
to determine how robust it is and how it will behave under such conditions. Fault
modeling can enable the prediction of system behavior under a variety of conditions
before actually creating the system. Various techniques for increasing system robustness can be tested in the design stage, allowing for the advantages and effectiveness
of different tradeoffs to be measured before implementation.
Various ways for realizing the process of fault modeling exist. The following
sections will discuss fault simulation and fault emulation, two common methods for
fault modeling, and will compare the two techniques.
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3.2

Fault Simulation
Fault simulation uses a model to simulate the behavior of a digital design under

various circumstances. Such a model can be described using a high level programming
language. Fault simulation can be performed with a varying degree of accuracy to
the real-life physical system. Models can range from the extremely simple to those
which account for every last minute detail. For example, a model for the occurrence
of upsets within the configuration memory of an FPGA may be so high-level that only
upsets affecting the behavior of logic devices may be modeled; on the other hand, it
may be so detailed as the model the interaction of individual transistors composing
the FPGA fabric utilized by a given FPGA design. This section will discuss fault
simulation techniques and the way in which they relate to digital circuits in general
and FPGAs in particular.
A register-transfer-level (RTL) simulation consists of breaking down the functionality and behavior of a design into two main components: the sections of a design
which temporarily store data values, or registers, and the combinational logic which
is used to interconnect or transfer data between these registers. Such a model is very
high level in nature as it relates to identifying the sensitive configuration memory
cross section for a given FPGA design. A high level programming language, such
as VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL), can be used to create such a
model[13]. VHDL serves this purpose particularly well, as it too is used to construct
RTL models. However, the RTL description used to model faults is not necessarily
functionally equivalent to actual VHDL code used to implement a given design; in
order to allow for the introduction of faults within a design, additional functionality
must be added. These additional locations providing fault injection capability can be
thought of as “injection points”, allowing for incorrect values to be written into the
design memory space, whether in the form of flip-flops, latches, or block memories.
The concept of RTL fault injection can be better illustrated through example.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a simple design consisting of a single-bit input, a single-bit output, a flip-flop and an XOR gate. The circuit can be used to perform a differential
encoding on a stream of input bits. The VHDL code in Figure 3.2 shows how the
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Figure 3.1: Differential encoder design.

functionality of the differential encoder design can be modified to include the capability of causing faulty design behavior. In this case, the output of the flip-flop can
be forced to be stuck at a particular value, defined by the generic variables stuck and
stuck at value.
The capabilities of fault simulation to accurately model the behavior of a given
digital system are only limited by the detail of the model itself. For example, the
model can be high-level, illustrating only the interaction of logic components instantiated in an FPGA design, or it can be very low-level, modeling the interaction of
the transistors which make up the instantiated components of an FPGA design. The
example in Figure 3.2 illustrates how simple it can be to implement fault simulation.
Such a fault simulation scheme can be used to test designs intended for implementation as an ASIC, allowing for fault detection or correction methods to be tested early
on in the design stage. However, such a high-level RTL fault simulation model for
FPGA designs only models upsets within the flip-flop and user memory space.
In order to address the inadequate fault coverage of RTL simulation for FPGAbased designs, researchers from Italy [14, 15, 16] have created an RTL fault simulation
model which accurately describes the behavior of Xilinx Virtex FPGAs, including the
interaction between the configuration memory and device behavior. Such a model
allows them to more accurately model fault behavior without executing a design in
hardware. These researchers reverse-engineered the functionality of each bit within
the configuration memory, allowing for the behavior of an FPGA design under the
influence of SEUs to be simulated. Their model describes circuit changes that occur
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entity d i f f e r e n t i a l e n c o d e r i s
generic (
stuck
: boolean
:= f a l s e ;
s t u c k a t v a l u e : s t d l o g i c := ’ 0 ’ ) ;
port (
clk
: in
std logic ;
din
: in
std logic ;
dout : out s t d l o g i c ) ;
end d i f f e r e n t i a l e n c o d e r ;
architecture r t l of d i f f e r e n t i a l e n c o d e r i s
signal xor out : s t d l o g i c ;
signal f f o u t : s t d l o g i c ;
begin

−− r t l

x o r o u t <= f f o u t xor d i n ;
dout <= f f o u t ;
c l o c k : process ( c l k )
begin −− p r o c e s s c l o c k
i f c l k ’ e v e n t and c l k = ’ 1 ’ then
f f o u t <= x o r o u t ;
end i f ;
i f s t u c k then
f f o u t <= s t u c k a t v a l u e ;
end i f ;
end process c l o c k ;

−− r i s i n g c l o c k e d g e

end r t l ;

Figure 3.2: VHDL code illustrating the concept of RTL fault simulation, corresponding to the design in Figure 3.2.

for each possible upset within the configuration memory. For a given FPGA design,
these circuit changes can be individually modeled in order to determine how they
affect overall design behavior.
Configuration memory upset simulation, as implemented by Violante, Ceschia,
Bellato, et al [14, 15, 16] does not model the effects of upsets within flip-flops or usermemory space; however, it does model the upset behavior of the entire configuration
memory bitstream, which is the most significant cross-section of an FPGA. For example, the Xilinx Virtex 1000 FPGA contains 24,576 flip-flops available for a given user
design, and a given design is defined by an array of 5,810,024 configuration memory
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bits. Previous studies[17] have shown that for this part configuration memory latches
are roughly 1.23 times more sensitive to upset than flip-flops. Taking these numbers
into account shows that in a static sense the configuration memory is about 290 times
more likely to be upset than a flip-flop memory element. Though the dynamic behavior of a design depends on the utilization of these flip-flop and configuration memory
elements, in general upsets within the configuration memory are the dominant factor
affecting the reliability of a given FPGA design. Because a full configuration memory upset simulation models the behavior of an FPGA design for upsets occurring
within each possible configuration memory location, an exhaustive simulation proves
computationally intensive and potentially slow.
Fault simulation can be used to approximate the likelihood of failure for particular constructs within an FPGA design. It can be useful for a quick analysis of
a small or simple section of a design, enabling an FPGA designer to receive quick
feedback, useful when iterating on a design mitigation technique.
3.3

Static Fault Estimation
An alternative to fault simulation, especially as it relates to modeling the

sensitive cross section of an FPGA design, consists of creating a model to estimate
the sensitivity of individual FPGA components to upset, along with the likelihood
of errors resulting from those upsets of propagating further through other FPGA
components[18]. Such a technique strives to speed up modeling time by simplifying
the number of individual components that need to be modeled, yet increase accuracy
by more realistically modeling the upset and propagation characteristics of FPGA
components through detailed analysis of these components. Such a system has been
implemented[18] which claims accuracy to within 95% of traditional fault injection
techniques, yet a much improved simulation time.
This approach is performed statically, meaning that the actual run time behavior of a design is not simulated. Rather, the likelihood of a error event and the
likelihood of error propagation is statically estimated for each sensitive node in the
design netlist description. This static estimation uses a statistical model which takes
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into account the logic function as well as physical characteristics of each sensitive
node.
Like fault simulation, static fault estimation can quickly become computationally expensive for large designs. Because a single event upset can be present in
the configuration memory potentially for multiple execution cycles, the error event
and propagation probability must be computed over multiple design execution cycles,
with the aggregate effects taken into effect for error propagation. This problem can
become exponential as the number of sensitive nodes and interconnections between
those nodes in a design netlist increases.
3.4

Fault Injection and Emulation
The results obtained from simulating or estimating the behavior of an FPGA

design in a radiation environment are only as accurate as the model describing the
upset behavior. An alternative to fault simulation and fault estimation is fault injection. Fault injection allows for exhaustive coverage of the entire configuration
memory, provides accurate fault behavior, but does not suffer from the computation constraints associated with simulation. In fact, by executing on hardware, fault
injection is capable of running orders of magnitude faster than a simulation.
Fault injection and fault emulation are two different names for the same testing procedure. During this process, the introduction of a fault within a system is
emulated; the consequences and subsequent behavior of the system, however, is the
true system behavior. Essentially, a fault is artificially injected at some point in a
real system, and the subsequent system behavior is monitored for a response.
One form of fault injection can be used to prototype ASIC hardware, using an
FPGA. This approach is very similar to the RTL fault simulation approach, with the
key difference being that the design is actually executed in hardware with additional
circuitry added to allow fault injection at desired testing points within the design.
Prototyping ASIC hardware on an FPGA takes advantage of the reprogrammable
properties of an FPGA to model the behavior of an ASIC design while still in the
design stage. Such an approach can be potentially orders of magnitude faster than the
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equivalent RTL simulation, simply because of the huge performance increase inherent with a hardware-based solution. The run-time reconfiguration capabilities of an
FPGA can be leveraged to dynamically alter the testing procedure, and with appropriate testing circuitry, both faults within the operation of circuit logic components
as well as within the user memory space can be modeled.
FPGA hardware with reprogrammable capability can also be used to model
faults within the configuration memory of FPGA designs. Such a configuration is ideal
for testing the way in which designs will perform on an FPGA platform operating in
a fault-causing environment. Similar to the configuration memory upset simulation
approach described earlier, fault injection within the configuration memory of an
FPGA can be used to model the consequences of configuration memory faults on an
FPGA design. Fault injection directly into the FPGA hardware can speedup fault
modeling time by orders of magnitude, while at the same time providing accurate
results because the design is actually executed in hardware.
A few fault injection schemes have been created for modeling SEU behavior in
FPGAs[19],[20]. One of these[19], relies upon generating an entirely new configuration
bitstream for each fault to be tested. Because the generation of the configuration
bitstream is done using the vendor FPGA tools each time, this process is too slow
for exhaustively testing an FPGA design. Another approach, created by engineers at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, used partial configuration bitstreams which were
generated on the fly as the test was performed. However, because of the slow interface
that was being used to reprogram the FPGAs, this approach also was too slow for
exhaustive design testing. Both approaches provide insight into the nature of SEU
emulation in the configuration memory of an FPGA; however, for realistic FPGA
design SEU behavior characterization, neither is sufficient.
3.5

Fault Simulation versus Fault Injection
Both fault simulation and fault injection have their respective strengths and

weaknesses. When trying to identify the sensitive cross section of the configuration
memory for a particular FPGA design, it is important not only that the model be
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accurate, but that results can be obtained quickly. These requirements will necessarily
dictate that one form of modeling be chosen over another.
Fault simulation is useful when a test cannot be performed directly in hardware. Such is often the case during design prototyping, when the finished design does
not yet exist. Additionally, situations exist when not all sections of the hardware to
be tested are accessible to test. This is also often the case when given a commercial
ASIC hardware solution, which is closed internally to fault testing.
The cost of fault simulation can potentially be less than fault injection, as
the actual hardware is not necessarily needed to perform testing. Rather, a software
model can be created to run on a computer, and the tests performed there. However,
this is only true when the model for fault simulation is simply enough to make the
development of an accurate model inexpensive enough to outweigh the costs of fault
injection. Additionally, the expense of the extra time required by a fault simulation
model must be taken into account.
Fault injection can be much faster than simulation, as true hardware execution
is typically orders of magnitude faster than equivalent software emulation. Additionally, hardware execution is guaranteed to yield correct behavior results, whereas the
results of simulation are only as good as the software model of the system being
simulated.
Fault injection allows for a design or system to be tested under conditions
which are very similar or identical to those which are present under true operating
conditions. This includes the asynchronous nature common to input output operations common to memories and shared data buses.
For fault modeling in FPGAs, it seems that the benefits of fault injection
outweigh those of fault simulation. This is particularly true in those FPGAs which
provide the capability of runtime reconfiguration, enabling the FPGA design to be
reprogrammed for the introduction of “faults” while the design is executed. The
true design behavior of the FPGA can be observed during fault present conditions.
Because the function of the configuration memory of an FPGA is often closed due to
commercial considerations, it may proved difficult to develop an accurate model of
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an FPGA for fault simulation. For these reasons, a fault injection too was created to
provide an accurate and fast model for estimating the sensitive configuration memory
cross section of an FPGA design.
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Chapter 4

Fault Injection Tool Architecture

Because of its speed and accuracy, fault injection is a beneficial method for
modeling faults in a digital system. Fault injection serves very well when identifying
the dynamic sensitive cross section of an FPGA design, providing an accurate model
for faults within the memory structures of an FPGA. Consequently, fault injection
can provide valuable insight into the effects of single event upsets within SRAM-based
FPGAs. This chapter describes the architecture of a fault injection tool developed
specifically to model the effects of single event upsets within the configuration memory
of an FPGA. The goals of this fault injection tool are to provide a fast method for
identifying the dynamic sensitive cross section of an FPGA design, which is both
reliable and accurate.
Fault injection is an excellent method for modeling faults within the configuration memory of an FPGA. However, when implementing a fault injection system, a
few things should be taken into consideration in order to ensure desirable and accurate
behavior. Of particular importance is the ability to inject faults into the configuration
memory of the design under test, be it through traditional configuration techniques
or run-time reconfiguration. Additionally, the speed with which a fault injection test
can be performed is important as the number of elements within the configuration
memory bitstream is already on the order of millions and is ever increasing. Finally,
the ability to present specific test vectors and observe design behavior in order to
determine design sensitivity to configuration memory upsets is necessary.
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the SLAAC-1V board as the architectural framework for fault injection. Next, the run time environment and software
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supporting fault injection testing with the SLAAC-1V board will be described. Finally, an example of typical results that can be obtained through fault injection testing
with the SLAAC-1V board will be presented, followed by a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using the SLAAC-1V board to perform fault injection
testing.
4.1

SLAAC-1V as a Fault Injection Tool
The ability to perform fault injection in an FPGA is very desirable for helping

to realize FPGA-based computing in space. The architecture of the SLAAC-1V board,
along with capabilities of the SLAAC-1V SDK, make it an attractive candidate for a
fault injection tool framework.
The SLAAC-1V board is a PCI card containing, from the perspective of the
user, three FPGAs and ten 36x256K ZBT SRAMs. These three FPGAs, known as
X0, X1 and X2, are interconnected through a 72-bit wide ring and a 72-bit wide
crossbar, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The SLAAC-1V board is accompanied by a set of libraries which provides
rich support for communication with and control of the SLAAC-1V board. These
libraries are based on C++, and are available on both the Linux and Windows platforms. The SLAAC-1V SDK libraries must be compiled along with the Virginia
Tech ACS API[21]. The SLAAC-1V SDK provides support for configuration of the
FPGAs (both full and partial), clock control, FIFO control, on-board memory access
and control, FPGA configuration memory readback, as well as support for SLAAC-1V
generated interrupts and direct SLAAC-1V board control register access[22].
Perhaps one of the main considerations in choosing a platform for a fault
injection testbed is the ability to inject faults rapidly into the configuration memory
of an FPGA. The SLAAC-1V and its accompanying libraries provide support for
configuration of the FPGAs. Partial runtime reconfiguration abilities can be leveraged
through the use of external libraries for generating partial configuration bitstreams.
Because both configuration and partial configuration routines are handled through
the Xilinx SelectMAP interface, configuration times are relatively fast.
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Figure 2 below shows the overall architecture from the user’s perspective. All bus widths
reflect the data path and do not include address or control lines. X0, X1, and X2 are the
main FPGA compute elements. All devices are XCV1000-6 parts. The main datapaths
between the FPGAs (the blue “ring” and the red “crossbar” shown below) are 72 bits
wide. The memory data paths are 36 bits wide (shown in black below). Also, 2-bit bidirectional handshake lines connect each PE to each other PE (not shown).
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Figure 4.1: SLAAC-1V top level block diagram[1].

Figure 2: SLAAC1-V Top-Level Block Diagram
X0 is most often used as to control X1 and X2, to route data to and from the FIFOs, and
to buffer data in its two memory banks. The FIFOs are each 64 bits wide. FIFOA0/B0
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bit location in the Xilinx Virtex 1000 part, roughly 99.97% of the data sent is pure
overhead. Fast reconfiguration times are necessarily of vital importance when dealing
with such a large data overhead for a single fault injection.
The physical architecture of the SLAAC-1V board lends itself well to a fault
injection testbed architecture. Such a fault injection architecture, as shown in Figure
4.1, consists of two behaviorally identical designs operating in parallel, as well as a
comparator which monitors the behavior of the two identical designs to ensure that
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they are operating correctly. One of the two behaviorally identical designs is run
by the device under test (DUT), while the other is referred to as the golden design.
During a fault injection test, faults are inserted into the configuration memory of the
DUT, and the comparator monitors the output of the DUT and golden design. Any
deviation of the DUT design from the behavior of the golden design indicates that
an error has occurred and that the a particular fault injection has caused the design
functionality to fail.

FPGA 1

FPGA 2

Comparator

Figure 4.2: An example fault injection testbed architecture.

The fault injection testbed architecture can be mapped to the SLAAC-1V
board as follows. The X0 device (see Figure 4.1) can be used to implement the
comparator functionality, as well as any additional control functionality necessary,
such as test vector presentation. The DUT design can be mapped to the X1 device,
and the golden design can be mapped to the X2 device. Both designs can operate
in parallel lock step, receiving identical test vector inputs from the X0 control design
over the crossbar interface, and sending their outputs to the X0 control design for
monitoring via the left and right sections of the ring interface. In this manner, the
X0 design can both present test vectors to the DUT and golden designs and monitor
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their outputs, signaling a behavior error to the host machine if the output behavior
of the DUT design ever deviates from the golden design.
4.2

Run-time Environment and Software
In order to leverage the SLAAC-1V hardware architecture and control designs,

host-side software for controlling fault injection testing has been created. The goals
of this software include the following:
• provide the capability to perform targeted fault injection,
• allow for a given design to be exhaustively tested in a timely and accurate
manner,
• enable specific test vector presentation,
• allow for designs requiring fault injection testing to be easily ported to the fault
injection testbed.
The execution and behavior of the host-side software can be simplified to
a simple state transition diagram in order to better illustrate its functionality, as
shown in Figure 4.2. The default behavior of the fault injection tool determines if
a correlation exists between the occurrence of an upset at a given configuration bit
location and the functional behavior of the design under test. The determination of
this correlation, if it exists, is necessary in order to establish the most likely behavior
of a given FPGA design in a radiation environment. Additionally, this information
can be used to gauge the usefulness and functionality of mitigation techniques used
to increase the reliability of an FPGA design in a radiation environment.
When determining what, if any, correlation exists between specific configuration memory upsets and incorrect design behavior, typically every location within
the configuration memory is tested according to a specific chain of events. This sequence of events can be described by the simple loop shown in Figure 4.2, or by the
pseudocode in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: Exhaustive fault injection test control flow.

Execution time for a typical fault injection test examining all locations within
the configuration memory is around 25 minutes. For the SLAAC-1V board, which
consists of Xilinx Virtex 1000 parts, such an exhaustive test consists of testing
5, 810, 024 configuration bits, equating to roughly 260 ms per bit tested.
It is important to realize that the length of testing time is heavily dependent
upon the amount of input test vector coverage desired per bit tested. It is easy to
see that exhaustive testing, both in terms of configuration memory location coverage
as well as input test vector coverage, would quickly become excessive. To illustrate,
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01: do {
02:
choose a configuration memory location for testing;
03:
inject a fault into the DUT by toggling the content of
that memory location;
04:
allow design to execute for a predetermined amount of time;
05:
compare the DUT and golden design to check for functional
design failure;
06:
if ( functional design failure ) {
07:
record configuration memory location;
08:
}
09:
repair configuration memory location;
10:
reset both the DUT and golden designs;
11: } while ( not all locations tested );

Figure 4.4: Pseudocode illustrating the flow of events during a typical fault injection
test.

consider a stateless design requiring 32 bits of input data. For example, in order to exhaustively test a design with no state, all possible input test vectors must be presented
for each possible configuration memory upset. For 32-bit wide input test vectors, the
design must execute 232 = 4, 294, 967, 296 cycles per configuration memory upset. For
a design executing at 100MHz in a Xilinx Virtex 1000 part, this equates to a total
test time of

4,294,967,296cycles
bit

× 5, 810, 024bits ×

seconds
100M cycles

= 249, 538, 630 seconds ≈

7.91 years. Clearly, such a time constraint is excessive. For designs with state this
number grows linearly as the state space of the design increases.
Fortunately, from data observed to date with the fault injection tool discussed,
the likelihood of observing errors due to configuration memory faults is very heavily
distributed at 100 percent for observation windows on the order of 260 ms. For
example, the histogram showing the distribution of the likelihood of seeing an output
error given that a sensitive configuration memory location has been upset is shown in
Figure 4.2 for the vmult72 design (described in more detail in Section 5.1.1 of the
next chapter). Thus, for most design styles, realistic testing times have proven to be
sufficient.
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of the probability of observing a design failure, given that a
sensitive configuration memory location has been upset, for the vmult72 design.

Supporting libraries had to be created in order to enable the fault injection
testing described. Of particular importance is the ability to generate partial configuration bitstreams, which can be used to toggle arbitrary bit locations within the
configuration memory. These configuration memory bit toggles are used to model
the introduction of a fault within the FPGA configuration memory. The creation of
these libraries are described in more detail in Appendix A.
The operation of the fault injection tool is not limited to the procedures described in this section. Several options for testing operation are provided, some of
which are suitable for particular occasions. The behavior of the fault injection tool is
dictated by the command line arguments provided at execution time. For example,
the number of configuration memory locations tested can be adjusted, as well as the
order in which those configuration memory locations are tested.
4.3

Example Results of Fault Injection Testing
During fault injection testing, the fault injection testbed gathers data about

the likelihood of a functional design failure given a particular configuration memory
upset. This information is represented by the means of two arrays, which are indexed
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by bit location. The first of these arrays represents how many times injecting a fault at
the given location resulted in incorrect design behavior. The second of these arrays
represents how many times a fault was injected at a given configuration memory
location. Thus, the ratio of the first array to the second array gives an estimate of
how sensitive, or likely to fail in when in a fault inducing environment, a given FPGA
design is.
The results of a fault injection test are actually stored in a file in an array
representation that can be parsed by Matlab. This representation can be read in by a
Matlab script, see for example Appendix C, and displayed in image format, providing
a feedback on the physical locations of the sensitive design areas. Though the offsets
of configuration locations within the configuration memory do not correspond directly
to physical device location, this information can be obtained through a process that
is described in more detail in Appendix B. It is in this physical device location format
that the results from a fault injection test are stored.
An example design which can be tested using the fault injection testbed is
shown in Figure 4.3. This design consists of an array of 400 8-bit counters, the
outputs of which are XOR’d together in order allow them to fit on the 72-bit output
data bus of the SLAAC-1V fault injection testbed architecture while preserving all
information about single errors within the design state space. The screen capture
shown in Figure 4.3 is a circuit view of the design taken from FPGA Editor, a Xilinx
tool enabling low-level FPGA design modifications. This figure shows the location of
nets within the design, which correspond highly to utilized site locations as well.
The results of fault injection for this design, after having been display visually,
can be seen in Figure 4.3. This particular design resulted in incorrect design behavior
for 191, 864 of the 5, 810, 024 tested configuration memory locations, equating to a
design sensitivity of 3.3%. Notice how the sensitive locations in Figure 4.3 correlates
to the location of utilized components in Figure 4.3.
It is reassuring to note that a high correlation exists between the location of
utilized FPGA resources and the location of sensitive configuration memory locations.
The fact that fault injection in sections critical to correct design operation results in
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Figure 4.6: Screen capture of an FPGA design as represented in FPGA Editor.

incorrect design behavior suggests correct operation of the fault injection testbed.
This alone, of course, is insufficient information in order to make such a claim; justification and proof of accurate fault injection operation are presented later in Chapter
6.
4.4

Advantages and Disadvantages
Though the SLAAC-1V board serves well as the framework for a fault injec-

tion testbed architecture, there are both inherent strengths and weaknesses in the
approach. Though most of the disadvantages of the SLAAC-1V fault injection tool
are also disadvantages common to true radiation testing, the strengths of this platform
actually provide an improvement over traditional radiation testing techniques.
In order to test the behavior of a design with the fault injection tool, the given
design must be ported to the Xilinx Virtex 1000 part and the SLAAC-1V architecture.
This includes the constraints placed by the number of available resources on the FPGA
part, in addition to the number of pins available for providing input test vectors and
34

1

0.9
200
0.8

0.7
400
0.6
600

0.5

0.4
800
0.3

0.2

1000

0.1
1200
500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

0

Figure 4.7: Representation of the sensitivity of the counter design presented in Figure
4.3.

capturing output for both the DUT and golden designs. Additionally, it is difficult
to successfully use multi-rate or triplicated clocks on the SLAAC-1V architecture
while maintaining lock step between the DUT and golden designs. However, these
limitations would be present as well for any radiation testing conducted with the
SLAAC-1V board.
Only the configuration memory sensitive cross section can be successfully and
reliably tested using the SLAAC-1V fault injection testbed. Access to the state of
user flip-flops is not directly supported in the Virtex family of Xilinx parts. This
behavior differs from that seen during radiation testing, where radiation sources can
upset the state of both the configuration memory and user flip-flop state. Thus,
comparisons between fault injection testing and true radiation testing must take into
account this difference. In general, however, this difference will account for a minor
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difference in overall design behavior statistics, as the sensitive cross section of user
flip flops when compared to that of the configuration memory is very small. For the
Xilinx Virtex 1000 part, this ratio is on the order of

24,576f lipf lopbits
5,810,024conf igurationbits

≈

1
,
236

or

roughly a difference of two orders of magnitude.
As has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter, coverage of input test
vectors cannot reach 100% when feasible testing times are desired. This limitation
exists simply because of the huge potential state space possible with certain designs,
when both the design state space and the state space of input test vectors are taken
into account. However, this limitation exists for both true radiation testing as well
as fault injection testing. It is important, however, to take this coverage into account
when performing either fault injection testing or radiation testing in order to ensure
that the consequences of faults within the configuration memory are likely to be
observed.
In its current form, the SLAAC-1V fault injection tool does not support arbitrary input test vector presentation. This is, however, a limitation imposed merely by
the X0 design used for fault injection test control. The current X0 design uses a 32-bit
wide LFSR to generate a pseudo-random sequence of input test vectors. It is simply
a matter of adding in additional design functionality to enable a desired sequence of
input test vectors to be presented to the test designs during fault injection testing.
The strengths of the SLAAC-1V fault injection testbed include rapid and
accurate design testing. Particularly useful is the ability to perform targeted tests.
When traditional radiation testing is performed, the locations at which configuration
memory upsets occur is really a random process. Additionally, the time intervals at
which these upsets occur is random as well. The stochastic nature of these upsets
during radiation testing makes it virtually impossible to perform targeted testing.
Additionally, it is difficult to isolate the dependence of a given design behavior error
on a particular configuration memory upset when the occurrence time of upsets is
random, and when these upsets can affect the state of user flip-flops without any
indication that such an upset has occurred. The fault injection tool, however, makes
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it possible to perform isolated and targeted testing of individual locations within the
configuration memory of an FPGA.
4.5

Summary
The capabilities of the SLAAC-1V fault injection tool make it very useful for

characterizing the fault behavior of FPGA designs. The capability is useful when
preparing an FPGA design for operation in a radiation environment and the likelihood of operational design failure under specific fault inducing conditions is desired.
Additionally, the fault injection tool provides a method for testing the effectiveness
of fault mitigation strategies. Mitigation strategies can be thoroughly tested with
the targeted abilities of the fault injection tool before conducting radiation testing,
thus enabling the strengths and weaknesses of different mitigation strategies to be
investigated under a controlled environment. Once such an investigation has been
performed, the results of such testing can be confirmed through radiation testing.
The SLAAC-1V fault injection testbed is a useful tool for the FPGA designer preparing designs which will operate in a radiation environment.
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Chapter 5

Fault Injection Test Results

The fault injection tool described in the previous chapter has been used to
characterize several FPGA designs. The results of this testing provides valuable
information useful for determining the expected operation of a given design in a radiation environment. Additionally, the results obtained suggest that the fault injection
tool correctly models SEU behavior. This chapter begins with a description of the
designs tested followed by a presentation of the results obtained and concludes with
a discussion of other areas in which the fault injection tool has been successfully used
for validation.
5.1

Test Designs
A variety of designs have been tested using the SLAAC-1V fault injection

testbed. Design styles range from pure feed-forward to feed-back only designs, to
a real-world design which contains components of both design styles. The designs
tested are explained in more detail in the following subsections.
5.1.1

Multiply Adder Tree Design
The multiply-and-add design tested consists of eight pipelined multipliers, fol-

lowed by a series of adders to sum the results. The same set of inputs is passed to each
of the eight multipliers. For inputs A and B, the final result is equal to 8×A×B. The
computation is performed on unsigned integer values, and bit-growth is accounted
for with the multipliers. However, bit-growth is ignored for the adders, so that the
bit-width of the output is equal to the sum of the widths of the inputs.
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O = 8*A*B
Figure 5.1: Multiply-and-Accumulate Test Design (vmult72).

The multipliers implemented use FPGA features specific to the Xilinx Virtex
architecture, particularly the MULT AND gate present in each slice and the carrychain logic. Four different versions of the multiply-and-add design were created.
Based on the width of the output, they are referred to as vmult72 (Virtex multiplyand-add with a 72-bit wide output), vmult54, vmult36, and vmult18. Different
widths were created in order to test the relationship between design size and sensitivity. The vmult72 design, with eight multipliers, was the largest design which could
be successfully placed-and-routed for the Virtex 1000. The other three designs are
simply scaled versions of the vmult72 design.
5.1.2

LFSR Design
The Linear Feedback Shift-Register(LFSR) design contains several LFSR Mod-

ules, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.2. Each LFSR Module contains six 20-bit LFSRs,
whose outputs are XOR’d together to form one bit of the design output. Like the
multiply-and-add design, four different versions of the LFSR design were created.
The 72-bit wide version (lfsr72) contains seventy-two LFSR modules. The outputs
of each module is one bit of the LFSR design output. In a similar fashion, the 54-bit
wide design (lfsr54) contains fifty-four LFSR Modules. The output of each one of
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Table 5.1: Device utilization for the multiplier-and-add designs.
Design
vmult18
vmult36
vmult54
vmult72
Available on
the XCV1000

Slices LUTs Flip-Flops
583
774
1, 000
4.7%
3.1%
4.1%
2, 206 2, 844
3, 744
18%
12%
15%
4, 781 6, 210
8, 848
39%
25%
36%
8, 308 10, 872
15, 264
68%
44%
62%
12, 288 24, 576
24, 576

Table 5.2: Device utilization for the LFSR designs.
Design Slices LUTs
lfsr18 2, 178
144
18% 0.59%
lfsr36 4, 356
288
35%
1.2%
lfsr54 6, 534
432
53%
1.8%
lfsr72 8, 712
576
71%
2.3%
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Flip-Flops
2, 160
8.8%
4, 320
18%
6, 480
26%
8, 640
35%

LFSR Module
LFSR Module

20 bit LFSR
20 bit LFSR
20 bit LFSR

LFSR Module

20 bit LFSR

.
.
.
.

20 bit LFSR

72 bits

LFSR Module

20 bit LFSR

Figure 5.2: LFSR Test Design.

these modules forms one bit of the LFSR design output. The LFSR design was also
created as a 36-bit and 18-bit version.
This implementation of the LFSR design uses only flip-flops; no Xilinx LUTRAM shift-registers were used. The LFSR design was created in order to observe
the effects of configuration SEUs on a feedback design dominated by state, with no
dependence upon input test vectors aside from the global clock and reset signals.
5.1.3

Signal Processing Kernel Design

Polyphase Filter

FFT

Magnitude Operation

Figure 5.3: Signal Processing Kernel design.

The (spk) design is a signal processing kernel that has been implemented by
FPGA designers at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This design filters all incoming
data through a polyphase filter bank, separating this data into 32 separate channels.
The polyphase filter operation is followed by an FFT and a magnitude operation
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Table 5.3: Device utilization for the spk design.
Design Slices LUTs
spk
5, 775 7, 499
47%
31%

Flip-Flops
9, 187
37%

Table 5.4: Device utilization for the counter designs.
Design
counter

Slices LUTs
2, 151 4, 250
18%
17%

Flip-Flops
3, 201
13%

for each of the 32 channels received from the polyphase filter (see Figure 5.1.3).
The feedforward nature of this computation would suggest that the design itself is
dominated by feedforward structures. However, control structures are used to manage
data flow between various components of the design.
5.1.4

Counter Design

8 bit counter
8

8 bit counter
8

Figure 5.4: Counter design.
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8 bit counter
8

The counter design consists of 400 8-bit counters (see Figure 5.1.4). A
parity bit for each counter is generated by computing an XOR of all 8 bits. These
400 parity bits are then reduced in number to 50 through a 3-level XOR operation.
Functionally, the first level consists of 200 2-input XOR gates, generating 200 outputs.
The second level consists of 100 2-input XOR gates, while the third level consists of
50 2-input XOR gates. These 50 bits are used as the design output bits. The process
of applying an XOR operation to the output of the counters allows us to detect all
single bit functional design failures.
5.1.5

CounterTMR Design

8 bit counterTMR

8 bit counter

8 bit counter

8 bit counter

voter

voter

voter

8 bit counterTMR
8

8 bit counterTMR

8 bit counterTMR

8

Figure 5.5: CounterTMR design.

44

8

Table 5.5: Device utilization for the counterTMR designs.
Design
Slices LUTs Flip-Flops
counterTMR 11, 251 22, 400
9, 601
92%
91%
39%

The counterTMR design is behaviorally equivalent to the counter design
(see Figures 5.1.4 and 5.1.5). However, this design consists of 400 counter modules
which have had Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) applied to them. Each TMR
counter module contains 3 8-bit counters, for a total of 1200. The next state value
of each TMR counter module is computed after being fed through a feedback voting
scheme containing 3 voters. This TMR counter module guarantees that no single
point of failure will cause the voted behavior of the counter module to fail.
As with the counter design, a parity bit is generated for each 8-bit counter
design. This time, however, 1200 parity bits are generated, one for each counter.
The parity bits from each TMR domain are separately reduced in number to 50 per
domain, as with the counter design. The 50 outputs from each TMR domain are
then voted on in order to generate a 50 bit bus used as the design output.
5.2

Sensitivity Results
All of the design described in this chapter have been subjected to fault injection

testing. Fault injection testing was performed on each design at a minimum of 50
separate times. Such multiple testing provides insight into what happens on average
to a particular bit of a given design, though on average we expect that this behavior
will be very similar, as explained by Figure 4.2 in the previous chapter.
It is interesting to note that, for a particular design style such as the vmult
family of designs, the design sensitivity scales with design size. This is to be expected,
because increased component utilization should equate to increased design sensitivity.
Another useful way of thinking about design sensitivity is in terms of normalized sensitivity. In this case, we normalize the sensitivity of a given design to
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Table 5.6: Design sensitivities obtained through fault injection. CBUs stands for
configuration bit upsets, OEs stands for output errors.
Design
vmult18
vmult36
vmult54
vmult72
lfsr18
lfsr36
lfsr54
lfsr72
spk
counter
counterTMR

CBUs
OEs
% Sensitivity
581,002,400
6,057,926
1.043%
581,002,400
25,031,616
4.308%
581,002,400
51,701,747
8.899%
2,324,011,200 357,898,191
15.4%
581,002,400
7,163,486
1.233%
581,002,400
14,318,381
2.464%
581,002,400
21,422,825
3.687%
581,002,400
30,446,011
5.240%
290,501,200
25,106,702
8.64%
290,501,200
9,635,835
3.32%
290,501,200
53,881
0.0001855%

Table 5.7: Normalized design sensitivities obtained through fault injection.
Design
Sensitive bits (average) Slices Normalized sensitivity
vmult18
60, 579
583
22.0%
vmult36
250, 316
2, 206
23.9%
vmult54
517, 017
4, 781
22.9%
vmult72
894, 744
8, 308
22.8%
lfsr18
71, 635
2, 178
6.96%
lfsr36
143, 184
4, 356
6.95%
lfsr54
214, 228
6, 534
6.93%
lfsr72
304, 460
8, 712
7.39%
spk
502, 134
5, 775
18.4%
counter
192, 717
2, 151
18.9%
counterTMR
1, 078
11, 251
0.000203%
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the FPGA component utilization for that design. This measure is useful because it
provides insight into how sensitive one particular design style is compared to another.
Essential, it provides a means for making the comparison of two vastly different design styles, such as the vmult and lfsr family of designs, more fair. We define
normalized sensitivity as follows:

normalized sensitivity =

sensitive bits total slices
·
.
total bits
utilized slices

(5.1)

The total number of configuration bits tested for the Virtex 1000 part is
5, 810, 024, while the total number of slices available on this part is 12, 288. The
normalized sensitivity gives us a better understanding of the sensitivity for a given
design style without any dependence on the size of a design. Similar design styles
should have similar numbers for normalized sensitivity. Such a trend can be clearly
seen in Table 5.2, where normalized sensitivities are presented for all designs discussed
thus far.
From this table we can see that for the vmult family of designs, on average
22% of the bits in each utilized slice of configuration logic are sensitive. From Table
5.2 we can infer that on average the vmult designs utilize the slices more efficiently
than the lfsr design, which are only about 7% sensitive on average.
Visual sensitivity maps have been created for all of the designs tested (see Appendix B). Such a sensitivity map plots the 2-dimensional locations of configuration
memory locations. The color of a given configuration memory location corresponds
to the sensitivity of the particular configuration memory location. For all designs
tested, sensitivity maps have been created and are compiled together in Appendix C.
5.3

Application of Results
Fault injection testing provides the FPGA with several forms of useful in-

formation. The reliability of fault mitigation techniques can be verified through an
exhaustive fault injection test session. However, this is not the only useful information
to be gathered from fault injection testing results. Fault injection testing can provide
insight into the expected behavior of an FPGA design in a radiation environment.
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For example, consider the vmult72 design, which showed a sensitivity of
15.4% through fault injection testing. From this information we can infer that 15.4%
of upsets within the configuration memory of an FPGA will result in a design failure. Given certain information about the radiation environment in which an FPGA
design will operate, statistics about the average time between design failures can be
computed. For example, a certain space orbit may have radiation characteristics
resulting in an average configuration memory upset rate of 1.2 upsets per day. In
such an environment, the vmult72 design could be expected to fail on average every
1.2 ·

1
15.4%

= 7.79days. Such information can be useful to system designers, who need

to incorporate measures for correcting overall system behavior when an FPGA design
fails.
5.4

Validation of Mitigation Techniques
The SLAAC-1V fault injection tool has proved valuable not only in character-

izing the SEU sensitivity of various FPGA designs, but has also been used to validate
various FPGA SEU mitigation techniques. The details of the validation process is
outlined below.
5.4.1

TMR Validation
Triple module redundancy (TMR) is a common technique used to enable fault

tolerant computing. Through an iterative process, the fault injection tool was used
as a tool in validating and creating an FPGA design which was 100% immune to all
single event upsets within the configuration memory[23].
The first iteration of a TMR FPGA design[23], though much more reliable
than their non-TMR versions, did not yield 100% bullet proof results. Through
analysis performed with the SLAAC-1V fault injection, the locations in the design
which were still allowing the design to fail were located. In this manner a technique
for 100% resistance against single points of failure within the configuration memory
of an FPGA was proven, without the need of accelerator-based radiation testing for
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intermediate evaluation of the mitigation technique. The fault injection tool proved
crucial in validating the effectiveness of this TMR technique.
5.4.2

Half-Latch Validation
The fault injection tool was also vital in validating the effectiveness of ini-

tial iterations of a half-latch removal tool[24]. Half-latches are latch-like structures
which are used to generate constant VCC and GND sources within the FPGA fabric. Because the state of these half-latches cannot by directly modified through the
configuration memory, an upset occurring within the half-latches can cause incorrect
design behavior that cannot be repaired through configuration bitstream scrubbing
techniques.
Initial tests with the fault injection tool showed that it is possible to indirectly modify the state of half-latches through a sequence of multiple configuration
memory upsets. Consequently, the fault injection tool proved useful in validating the
effectiveness of initial iterations of a half-latch removal tool. Once it was determined
that the half-latch tool correctly mitigated the effects of all half-latches capable of
being modified by the fault injection tool, radiation testing was used to validate its
performance. By using the fault injection tool, costly radiation testing was able to
be avoided during initial validating of the half-latch removal tool.
5.5

Conclusion
The SLAAC-1V fault injection tool has been used to test a variety of designs.

This testing provides FPGA designers with an estimate of how sensitive their designs
would be in a radiation environment. Additionally, the fault injection tool has already
proved useful in validation techniques for FPGA design fault tolerance. It should continue to prove its usefulness in validating future mitigation techniques. Initial fault
injection results, such as a comparison between sensitive configuration memory locations and utilized device locations (see Appendix C) as well as normalized sensitivity,
suggest that fault injection testing results are accurate.
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Chapter 6

Cyclotron Proton Accelerator Test and Validation

Although the results obtained with the fault injection tool are very promising
and seem to stand on their own, it is desirable to validate the accuracy of this tool. To
this end, radiation testing has been performed using the cyclotron proton accelerator
at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory, UC Davis in November of 2002. As part of this
experiment, designs already characterized with the fault injection tool were tested.
The goal of these tests was to correlate the results obtained from the fault injection
tool with those obtained from radiation testing.
Radiation testing utilizes a radiation source to bombard an electronic device
under test. Radiation testing provides an environment most similar to that which
a space-based FPGA computing machine could expect to encounter. In a space
environment, cosmic radiation can alter the behavior of an FPGA design through
altering the contents of state within the design as well as by altering the contents of
the configuration memory which define the operation of the design. Radiation testing
is useful in order to prepare an FPGA design for computing readiness in a radiation
hostile environment. However, the costs of radiation testing, both monetary and in
terms of time, can be excessive. Additionally, it is difficult to perform conclusive
targeted experiments during radiation testing. In general, statistics about device or
design behavior are gathered in order to infer general behavioral trends.
The fault injection tool described in Chapter 4 seems like a much more useful
alternative to radiation testing for several reasons. This tool has the ability to perform targeted tests in terms of configuration memory locations upset as well as input
test vector presentation during testing. Tests performed with the fault injection tool
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are generally fast and provide a high degree of test control. However, until the performance of the fault injection tool has been validated and shown to be representative
of general FPGA design behavior in a radiation environment, the results from the
fault injection tool cannot be reliably trusted. In order to verify the performance of
the SLAAC-1V fault injection tool, radiation testing has been performed, followed by
subsequent test analysis for correlation between radiation and fault injection testing.
Crocker Nuclear Laboratory holds a medium energy particle accelerator[25].
This particle accelerator is capable of emitting protons, useful for the simulation of radiation effects caused by cosmic and solar radiation. The facilities at Crocker Nuclear
Laboratory, UC Davis were used for radiation testing of FPGA designs for several
reasons. The cyclotron proton accelerator emits protons at 63.3 MeV. This energy
level has been shown to be well above the saturation cross-section for the design components of the Virtex 1000 part[5], meaning that all sensitive or design critical device
sections can be tested. The flux of the proton beam at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory
can be adjusted over a wide range including 1.0E7p/cm2 · s up to 3.5E7p/cm2 · s. This
control is both necessary and desirable for dynamic radiation testing of FPGA designs, as it allows for control of the overall upset rate within the FPGA configuration
memory.
By conducting radiation testing, it is desired to show that the behavior of
fault injection tests closely model those of true radiation tests. This will be done by
comparing the average sensitivities of designs tested through fault injection testing
with results of radiation testing. Additionally, comparisons will be made between
predicted and actual fluence to design failure. Finally, an event by event comparison
between the two test types will be made. This will be done in order to show that
upsets observed to cause design failure during radiation testing also cause design
failure during fault injection.
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the way in which the radiation
testing was conducted. Next, results obtained from the test will be discussed. Finally, the various methods for correlating radiation testing with fault injection will
be presented.
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6.1

Radiation Testing
The type of testing performed at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory for the validation

of the SLAAC-1V fault injection tool is described in more detail in the following
subsections. First, the details of dynamic radiation will be discussed. This will be
followed by a presentation of the actual procedure, in terms of hardware and software
setup, used to conduct the radiation testing.
6.1.1

Dynamic Radiation Testing
In order to validate the fault injection tool, dynamic FPGA design testing

was performed. Static testing is typically used to determine the sensitivity of a given
device, or the device sensitive cross section. Dynamic testing is used to determine
the design sensitive cross section, or the likelihood of observing a design failure.
Static testing can be used to determine the likelihood of observing an upset
within the configuration memory of an FPGA given certain radiation conditions. This
information is useful when determining the expected number of upsets in a particular
device given a certain radiation environment. For example, the number of upsets that
a space-based FPGA mission could expect to experience per day can be computed
based on the radiation characteristics of the orbit on which the space mission will be,
along with the sensitive device cross section, which indicates the average fluence to
upset.
Whereas static testing provides information regarding the sensitive device cross
section, dynamic testing provides information about the design sensitive cross section.
The results of dynamic testing give statistics for how often the function of a particular
design will fail in a given radiation environment. The two types of information are
fundamentally different. The static cross section applies in general to all designs
implemented on the particular device tested, and must be known in order to make
any decisions about the relationship between a radiation environment and the amount
of upsets that will be experienced.
Conversely, the dynamic cross section is valid only on a design by design
basis, and provides insight into the actual functional design behavior. Both types of
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information, however, are crucial in determining the behavior of a particular FPGA
design in a given radiation environment. Given a particular radiation environment,
the static cross section allows the inference of expected device upsets. Once the
number of expected device upsets is known, the dynamic design cross section can be
used to compute the number of expected functional design failures.
The type of testing made possible through the SLAAC-1V fault injection tool
is dynamic testing, or testing to determine the sensitive cross section for a given
FPGA design. Thus, it is dynamic radiation testing that needs to be performed, on
a design by design basis, in order to correlate the fault injection tool behavior with
results from radiation testing.
6.1.2

Radiation Testing Procedure
In order to correlate fault injection testing results and radiation testing re-

sults, the testing procedures of both need to be as similar as possible. The radiation
testing platform used for validation of the fault injection tool was largely based on the
SLAAC-1V fault injection testbed infrastructure, though the means of introducing
faults into the system is provided by a radiation source.
Like the SLAAC-1V fault injection architecture, the radiation testing framework also consists of a DUT, golden design, and a control design. These designs
once again reside inside of X1, X2, and X0, respectively. However, instead of faults
being injected into the configuration memory of the DUT through software, this is
accomplished be means of a radiation source.
The software controlling the SLAAC-1V board for radiation testing is also very
similar to the fault injection software. This similarity was intentionally implemented
so as to allow for fault injection testing and radiation testing to utilize the SLAAC-1V
hardware in the same manner, as well as the enable for designs modified for use with
the fault injection tool to also be used for radiation testing.
While the radiation beam causes upsets within the configuration memory of the
DUT FPGA, the design is monitored for functional failures. The timestamp of each
failure is recorded for later correlation with configuration memory upset occurrences.
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Additionally, the configuration memory is constantly readback and monitored for
upsets. Whenever they are found, their location is recorded along with a time stamp,
and the upsets are repaired.
6.1.3

Test Setup

Top View
.75" Aluminum shielding
SLAAC1-V PCI card
control

golden part

63.3 MeV p+

socketed DUT
part number:
XCV1000
FG680AFP0017
F1102747A
5C

vacuum

Side View
socketed DUT
SLAAC1-V PCI card
.75" Aluminum
shielding

Linux PC
PCI extender card
ethernet to control room

Figure 6.1: Diagram illustrating the physical setup of the SLAAC-1V board and host
computer for radiation testing.

The SLAAC-1V board needs to be set up in such a manner as to allow it to be
irradiated, in order to induce faults within the DUT. However, the rest of the testbed
platform needs to be protected from radiation. As shown in Figures 6.1.3 and 6.1.3,
the SLAAC-1V board was positioned outside of the PC to which it is connected by
means of a PCI extender card. This allows for the DUT to be placed directly in
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Figure 6.2: Photograph of the physical setup of the SLAAC-1V board and host
computer for radiation testing.

the proton beam while still partially protecting the PC. Additionally, .75” aluminum
shielding was used to surround the PC and to protect the remaining components of
the SLAAC-1V board.
In order to enable extended radiation testing, the DUT on the SLAAC-1V
board was replaced with a socketed part. In this manner, once the total ionizing
dose for a given XCV1000 part has been reached, it can be replaced with a new part,
without having to replace the entire SLAAC-1V board. In order to allow for this part
to be socketed, 36 of the 72 crossbar FPGA interconnect lines had to be severed, as
well as the daughter memory cards removed. This limited some of the SLAAC-1V
functionality, but none that was critical for proper operation of the fault injection
tool or for radiation testing.
The PC containing the SLAAC-1V board was placed in the radiation testing
chamber where it could be irradiated by the proton beam. Control of the SLAAC-1V
board and host computer was provided remotely through connection via ethernet to
the control room.
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6.1.4

Software
In order to control radiation testing, the software base for fault injection testing

had to be slightly modified. This is due to the constraints imposed by radiation
testing, where the occurrence of upsets within the configuration memory is random,
and both the configuration memory upset events and design failure events need to
be recorded. The resulting software loop which provides most of the functionality for
the radiation test is presented in Figure 6.1.4.
During radiation testing, faults are introduced into the configuration memory
by a radiation source, rather than being manually injected. The main software loop
monitors the DUT for functional failures as well as configuration memory upsets. In
an effort to allow for a correlation to be made between the occurrence of functional
design failures and configuration memory upsets, timestamps of both types of events
are recorded along with the location of configuration memory upsets. Whenever a
configuration memory upset is observed it is immediately repaired. Additionally, the
designs are reset whenever a functional failure occurs, in order to resynchronize the
behavior of both designs. The sequence of events for this process is outlined in Figure
6.1.4. Because of the time constraints imposed by performing a configuration memory
readback, each iteration of the loop requires roughly 430 ms on average to complete.
6.2

Radiation Testing Results
The radiation testing conducted at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory in November

of 2002 was quite successful, in that the results of radiation testing were able to be
correlated to fault injection testing. An outline of the tests conducted, the results
obtained, as well as a brief discussion of those results is provided below.
6.2.1

Designs Tested
In order to provide a foundation for the comparison of radiation testing results

with fault injection testing results, some of the same designs that were extensively
tested with the fault injection tool were brought to Crocker Nuclear Laboratory for

57

yes

yes

no
yes

no
yes

no
no

yes

Figure 6.3: Control flow of radiation testing software.

radiation testing. Because of limited beam-time, only a small subset of the extensively tested designs were subjected to radiation testing. The designs tested were the
vmult36, vmult72 and the lfsr72 designs.
The most extensive testing was performed on the vmult72 design, which
testing lasted for a total of 4 hours and 7 minutes. The vmult36 design was tested
for a total of 1 hour and 2 minutes, while the lfsr72 design was tested for only 17
minutes total. This information is summarized in Table 6.2.2
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Figure 6.4: Number of observed configuration memory upsets per observation cycle
during radiation testing.

The radiation testing was conducted using protons at 63.3M eV . The flux, or
the number of protons per unit area and unit time, of the proton beam was varied
between 1.0e7 cmp2 ·s and 3.5 × 107 cmp2 ·s . Protons were chosen for the radiation test
because their lower interaction rate with silicon allows for the desired upset rate within
the configuration memory of the FPGA to be obtained. During the dynamic testing
of the FPGA designs it was desirable to obtain on average only one configuration
memory upset per observation cycle, in order to avoid multiple simultaneous upsets.
The flux at the test was adjusted to average approximately one per observation cycle.
However, as can be seen from the histogram showing the distribution of configuration
memory upsets per cycle in Figure 6.2.1, there were cases of multiple upsets per
observation cycle.
6.2.2

Test Results
The test conducted at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory in November of 2002 con-

sisted of multiple testing objectives. The results for those tests which were aimed to
address the issue of validation of fault injection testing results are presented in Table
6.2.2. The first column gives the name of the design tested, followed by the total time
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Table 6.1: Accelerator Testing Results for vmult36, vmult72, and lfsr72 Designs.
Design

Testing
Time
vmult36 1h 2m
vmult72 4h 7m
lfsr72
0h 17m

Design
Failures
148
3,351
53

Configuration
Upsets
3,003
21,236
1,069

Design Failures
per Upset
0.0493
0.158
0.0496

Table 6.2: Comparison of design SEU sensitivity from accelerator testing and from
fault injection testing.
Design

Accelerator
Design Failures
per Upset
vmult36
0.0493
vmult72
0.158
lfsr72
0.0496

Fault Injection
Design Failures
per Upset
0.0397
0.154
0.04909

the design was tested. Next, the number of design failures observed during radiation
testing is shown, along with the number of observed configuration memory upsets.
Finally, the average design failures per configuration memory upset, or average design
sensitivity, is provided.
When compared to the total number of unique configuration upsets that could
have occurred during accelerator testing, namely 5,810,024, the number of observed
events is small. For the longest test, namely of the vmult72 design, only 21,236
configuration memory upsets were observed. The total number of testable configuration memory locations in the Virtex 1000 part is 5,810,024, meaning that only
0.37% of the device was tested, assuming that each upset occurred at a unique location. However, total testing time was the limiting factor for how much data could by
gathered.
An initial comparison of the radiation testing results to fault injection results
seems to indicate that the fault injection tool gives fairly accurate results. A direct
comparison of the number of design failures per upset for the two test types shows
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that on average accelerator testing gives more failures per upset. The difference is
subtle, and it is encouraging that in all cases that the number of failures per upset is
greater during radiation testing. Such a result could possibly be explained by the fact
that during radiation testing an additional cross-section, namely the user flip-flops, is
being tested. Additionally, the lack of sufficient data during accelerator testing may
be a cause for a slight skew in these results.
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Figure 6.5: Histogram of the observed fluence to design failure for the vmult72
design during radiation testing.

In addition to the total number of design failures and configuration memory
upsets observed during the radiation test, the average fluence to configuration upset
was computed. The fluence to configuration upset is defined as the number of protons
per unit area before observing an upset within the configuration memory of the FPGA.
Additionally, the average fluence to design failure was computed. This corresponds
to the number of protons per unit area before observing a design failure. The values
for observed fluence to configuration upset and observed fluence to design failure are
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Figure 6.6: Histogram of the predicted fluence to design failure for the vmult72,
calculated using fault injection testing results and average observed fluence to configuration memory upset during radiation testing.

shown in Table 6.2.2. This table also shows the predicted fluence to design failure for
the three designs tested. This predicted value is computed by combining information
from fault injection testing about the average number of configuration memory upsets
per design failure with information from radiation testing about the average fluence
to configuration upset.
A histogram was created to illustrate the fluence to design failure based on
data from the radiation testing for the vmult72 design (see Figure 6.5). From this
histogram, it is clear that the occurrence of design failures, like the occurrence of
configuration memory upsets themselves, are Poisson in nature. As such, they can
be modeled by an exponential distribution, which form the histogram in Figure 6.5
clearly takes. In a fashion similar to how the predicted average fluence to design
failure was generated in Table 6.2.2, a histogram for the predicted fluence to design
failure for the vmult72 design was created. This data was created from a series
of random fault injection tests, in order to determine the number of configuration
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Table 6.3: Observed average fluence to configuration upset, observed average fluence
to design failure, and predicted average fluence to design failure.
Design
vmult36
vmult72
lfsr72

Average Fluence to Average Fluence to
Configuration Upset
Design Failure
7 +
2
1.3e P /cm
2.6e8 P + /cm2
7 +
2
1.2e P /cm
7.8e7 P + /cm2
9.8e6 P + /cm2
2.0e8 P + /cm2

Predicted Fluence
to Design Failure
2.7e7 P + /cm2
7.5e8 P + /cm2
2.2e8 P + /cm2

memory upsets between design failures. By combining this information with the data
from radiation testing for the average fluence to configuration memory upset, the
histogram in Figure 6.6 was created. The fact that the distribution of these two
histograms is very similar indicates that the behavior of fault injection and radiation
testing is very similar.
Though this data seems encouraging, it is not enough to prove the accuracy of
fault injection test results. A more thorough investigation would consist of attempting
to correlate a particular design failure observed during radiation testing with an
individual configuration memory upset. In this manner, the results of accelerator
Testing could be more directly compared to fault injection testing.
6.3

Correlation of Fault Injection Tool Performance with Radiation Test
In order to attempt to validate the performance of the fault injection tool

results, a more in depth analysis of the accelerator testing results and a comparison
of these results with fault injection test results has been performed. The details of
this analysis are presented below.
6.3.1

Correlation Procedure
Because of the order in which event processing occurs in this loop, it is possible

that the observation of a sensitive configuration memory upset and the corresponding
design failure can occur during the same iteration of the event loop, or that the
observation of the sensitive configuration memory upset can occur one event loop
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type of event observed

time stamp (ms)

configuration
memory location

predicted
sensitivity

configuration upset

9955

2712129

0%

configuration upset

17640

655930

0%

design failure

18070

configuration upset

18070

4504172

100%

configuration upset

18499

4275042

0%

a design failure occurred here, so search in the previous
window of 645ms for a sensitive configuration upset event
a sensitive configuration upset occurred here, so mark
this upset as causing the design failure in question

18070
645ms

Figure 6.7: Example output from radiation testing, in which a sensitive configuration
memory upset is illustrated.

cycle prior to the observation of the design failure. In order to attempt to correlate
design failures to sensitive configuration memory upsets, both the event cycle on
which the design failure occurred and the cycle immediately prior must be searched
for sensitive configuration memory upsets. Because the average time for an event
loop was 430 ms, the accelerator results are searched in a time window of 1.5 × 430
ms for a sensitive configuration memory upset whenever a design failure occurs. The
sensitivity of individual configuration memory upsets is provided by fault injection
testing results.
An example of when a sensitive configuration memory upset and a design
failure are observed on the same event loop cycle is shown in Figure 6.3.1. In this
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type of event observed

time stamp (ms)

configuration
memory location

predicted
sensitivity

configuration upset

19217003

3172218

0%

configuration upset

19217003

5836116

0%

configuration upset

19217431

2381516

100%

design failure

19217857

configuration upset

19217857

629276

0%

a design failure occurred here, so search in the previous
window of 645ms for a sensitive configuration upset event
a sensitive configuration upset occurred here, so mark
this upset as causing the design failure in question

19217431

19217857
645ms

Figure 6.8: Example output from radiation testing, in which a sensitive configuration
memory upset is illustrated.

example, a design failure occurred at time stamp 18070 ms. Consequently, the time
window consisting of the 645 ms prior to time stamp 18070 ms is searched for a
sensitive configuration memory upset. In this case, a sensitive configuration memory
upset is also found at time stamp 18070 ms. For this reason, the design failure
occurring at time stamp 18070 ms is classified as a sensitive configuration memory
upset.
Another example of a sensitive configuration memory upset is shown in Figure
6.3.1. In this case, a design failure occurred at time stamp 19217857 ms. A sensitive
configuration memory upset was not found at this same time stamp; however, one
was found in the 645 ms window prior to time stamp 19217857 ms. Because this
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type of event observed

time stamp (ms)

configuration
memory location

predicted
sensitivity

configuration upset

1161224

2712129

0%

configuration upset

1162513

655930

0%

design failure

1165095

configuration upset

1165095

1592915

0%

configuration upset

1165095

2311139

0%

a design failure occured here, so search in the previous
window of 645ms for a sensitive configuration upset event
no sensitive configuration upset occurs within the 645ms
window, so mark this design failure as a flip-flop upset

1165095
645ms

Figure 6.9: Example output from radiation testing, in which a sensitive flip-flop upset
is illustrated.

sensitive configuration memory upset was found, this design failure is also classified
as a sensitive configuration memory upset.
Finally, an example of an unexplained design failure is shown in Figure 6.3.1.
In this example, a design failure occurred at time stamp 1165095 ms. However, when
the 645 ms time window is searched for an explanatory configuration memory upset,
none is found. Because no other likely cause for the design failure can be found,
this unexplained design failure is not likely due to an upset within the configuration
memory. The likely explanation for this design failure is the occurrence of an upset
within the design flip-flops. Other possible explanations include upsets of multiple
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simultaneous configuration memory locations, or an upset within some other unknown
sensitive cross section.
6.3.2

Correlation Results
The correlation of accelerator results with fault injection testing results indi-

cates accurate SEU emulation. As described in the previous subsection, this correlation is performed by individually examining the events that occurred during radiation
testing, and comparing it to results obtained through fault injection.
Data has been gathered by Xilinx about the heavy ion saturation cross section
for configuration memory latches as well as the heavy ion saturation cross section
for flip-flops[17]. In both cases, this sensitivity refers to the single event upset heavy
ion saturation cross section. This data was gathered for the QPro Virtex series
parts, which are the rad-hard equivalents to the Virtex series. The data gathered
for this family of FPGAs indicates a single event upset flip-flop heavy ion saturation
cross section of 6.5E-8

cm2
,
bit

whereas the single event upset configuration latch heavy

ion saturation cross section is 8.0E-8

cm2
[17].
bit

configuration memory latches are on average

From this data, we can infer that

8.0E−8
6.5E−8

≈ 1.23 times more sensitive to

single event upsets than flip-flops.
Combined with information about the number of observed configuration memory upsets and the number of utilized flip-flops in a given design, this relative sensitivity can be used to infer the number of expected design critical flip-flop upsets.
Equation 6.1 can be used to compute this expected value.

configuration upsets
1
× utilized FFs ×
= predicted FF upsets
total configuration bits
1.23

(6.1)

Using this equation, the predicted flip-flop upsets in Table 6.3.2 were generated
for the designs tested with the proton accelerator. This predicted value is contrasted
with the number of unexplained design failures found when correlating the accelerator
results with fault injection results. The ratio of these values ranges between 1.27 and
1.57, showing that the number of unexplained failures is greater than the number
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Table 6.4: Observed unexplained failures during radiation testing, most likely due to
upsets within flip-flops, contrasted with the predicted number of flip-flop upsets.
Design
vmult36
vmult72
lfsr72

Flip-Flops
3,744
15,264
8,640

Configuration
Upsets
3,003
21,236
1,069

Unexplained
Failures
2
71
2

Predicted FlipFlop Upsets
1.57
45.3
1.29

of predicted flip-flop upsets. This discrepancy may be due to incorrectly identifying
failures during the correlation with fault injection results, an additional unknown
sensitive cross section, or because of incorrect relative sensitivities between flip-flops
and configuration latches for the non-radhard Virtex family of FPGAs.
In addition to allowing the design failures to be classified according to their
most likely cause, fault injection results can be used to predict the expected number of design failures due to upsets within sensitive configuration memory locations.
Exhaustive fault injection testing provides an overall sensitivity number for a given
design. Information about the number of total configuration upsets observed during accelerator testing can be utilized to predict the number of those upsets which
should be classified as sensitive. This predicted number is compared with the observed number of sensitive configuration upsets (determined as described in Section
6.3.1) in Table 6.3.2. The equation for determining the predicted number of sensitive
configuration upsets is shown in Equation 6.2.

config upsets × predicted sensitivity = predicted sensitive config upsets

(6.2)

The comparison of observed sensitive configuration upsets to predicted sensitive configuration upsets in Table 6.3.2 shows a relatively close match, with a worst
case error of about 11.6%. Using information for the sensitivity of a given design
as predicted by fault injection testing, an estimated probability distribution function
(PDF) indicating the likelihood of observing a particular design sensitivity given the
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Table 6.5: The number of design failures attributed to sensitive configuration memory upsets, as observed during radiation testing, contrasted with predicted sensitive
configuration upsets.
Design

vmult36
vmult72
lfsr72

Configuration
Upsets

Predicted
Sensitivity

3,003
21,236
1,069

4.3%
15.4%
5.3%

Observed
Sensitive
Configuration
Upsets
146
3280
51

Predicted
Sensitive
Configuration
Upsets
129.13
3270.3
56.657

%
Error

11.6%
0.296%
11.1%

Table 6.6: The mean and standard deviation of design sensitivity calculated from fault
injection testing, given that as many configuration upsets occurred as were observed
during radiation testing.
Design
Mean
lfsr72
0.053
vmult36 0.043
vmult72 0.15

Std Dev
0.0069
0.0037
0.0025

number of configuration memory upsets observed can be generated. Such a PDF can
provide a better sense for how well the accelerator and fault injection results match
up.
Figures 6.3.2, 6.11 and 6.12 show the estimated PDFs for expected accelerator design sensitivity for the lfsr72, vmult36 and vmult72 designs, respectively.
These PDFs were generated by simulating a series of 10,000 trials given the number
of configuration upsets that were observed during accelerator testing for each design.
The histogram was created from data points gathered from these simulations. The
curve is the plot of a normal PDF distribution for each set of trials, given the mean
and standard deviation of the data gathered for each of these trials (see Table 6.3.2).
The match of the curve to the histogram indicates that a normal PDF is a good
description of the type of PDF observed.
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Figure 6.10: Histogram of the likelihood of observing a given design sensitivity for the
lfsr72 design, given the number of configuration memory upsets as observed during
radiation testing.
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Figure 6.11: Histogram of the likelihood of observing a given design sensitivity for
the vmult36 design, given the number of configuration memory upsets as observed
during radiation testing.
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Figure 6.12: Histogram of the likelihood of observing a given design sensitivity for
the vmult72 design, given the number of configuration memory upsets as observed
during radiation testing.
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Against each PDF is shown the design sensitivities, given that all design failures were due to configuration memory upsets (the black line to the right), as well as
given only those design failures which could be attributed to configuration memory
upsets (the line in green to the left). In the ideal situation, these lines would line
up directly with the mean of the PDF, at its highest point. However, because if
the insufficient amount of data gathered during accelerator testing, there is a finite
probability that the actual observed sensitivity will not lie at the mean of the PDF.
The normal PDF is tighter with a smaller standard deviation. The standard
deviation becomes smaller with an increased number of total configuration memory
upsets. Consequently, the PDF for the lfsr72 is the least tight fit, whereas the PDF
for the vmult72 design has the tightest bound. Thus, the percent errors discussed
previously do not mean as much as how well the observed sensitivity lines fall within
the bounding curve of the PDF. For all designs tested at the proton accelerator,
the actual observed design sensitivity, whether based on the total number of design
failures or only those failures which could be attributed to a configuration memory
upset, seems to fall reasonably well within expected values when compared to the
estimated PDF for each design.
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Chapter 7

Conclusions

The fault injection tool described in this thesis has been shown to be capable
of accurately and rapidly identifying the dynamic sensitive cross section of FPGA
designs. This sensitive cross section identified through fault injection testing has
been shown to match up very well to the sensitive cross section identified during
dynamic radiation testing.
This tool will allow FPGA designers to forecast the reliability of FPGA designs in a radiation environment. Additionally, it allows for the performance of SEU
mitigation techniques to be evaluated. This evaluation will enable FPGA designers to
choose mitigation techniques appropriate to the design size and reliability constraints
of a given system. A variety of designs have already been characterized using the
fault injection tool. This information provides feedback regarding which sections of
a particular design are the most sensitive.
The speed with which fault injection testing can be performed, and the accuracy of fault injection testing results, make it a viable alternative to radiation testing.
Fault injection can be used as an intermediate step for validating various FPGA designs. It is envisioned, however, that final verification will still be conducted using
traditional radiation testing.
The ability to quickly and accurately test FPGA designs will make their use in
space based applications more likely. Various fault mitigation and design redundancy
techniques can be thoroughly and exhaustively tested both rapidly and reliably. As
FPGA designs become more reliable in a radiation environment, they will be seen as
more likely solutions for space based computing. This will be made possible due to
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unique blend of flexibility and performance inherent in an FPGA computing solution,
combined with improved reliability techniques.
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Appendix A

Bitstream Generation For Partial Run-time Reconfiguration

Of crucial importance to performing fault injection tests with the SLAAC1V board was the ability to generate partial configuration bitstreams. Without this
ability, the speed of fault injection testing would have been compromised. Rather
than reconfigure the entire device each time a single bit needed to be toggled, using
partial reconfiguration techniques, only a single frame’s worth of configuration data
needs to be generated and sent to the device. The savings in data transaction is on
the order of

4778
.
1

This is because the entire configuration memory of the Virtex 1000

FPGA consists of 4778 frames, whereas the smallest atomic unit of reconfiguration is
1 frame.
Information specific to configuration commands and the format for configuration bitstream data can be readily found online in Application Notes published by
Xilinx[26],[27]. It is largely from this information that the partial bitstream generation capability was added to the functionality of the fault injection tool.
A key configuration command helped to simplify the partial reconfiguration
process. Internally, a Xilinx FPGA keeps a 16-bit CRC value for all configuration
data that has been sent. Upon completion of a configuration transaction, the internal
CRC must match with the CRC value contained at the end of the configuration
bitstream. This is done by writing this value to a CRC register. The internal CRC
value and the value of the CRC register are XOR’d together in this process, meaning
that success has occurred if the result CRC register value is all zero.
It is possible to avoid computation of this CRC value for each partial configuration bitstream, which can be a significant savings given that fault injection testing
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typically consists of generating thousands of partial configuration bitstreams. The
configuration command which enables this simplification is the command to reset the
internal CRC register to zero. This command can be issued in place of the command
to write the CRC register value. Although this negates potential error checking intended to occur because of the inclusion of the CRC in the first place, it greatly
simplifies the generation of partial configuration bitstreams.
A portion of the source code used by the fault injection tool to generate partial
configuration bitstreams is shown in the source code section below.
A.1

Partial Configuration Bitstream Generation Source Code

unsigned char ∗ P a r t i a l B i t s t r e a m : : w r i t e P a r t i a l B i t s t r e a m S E U S i m ( i n t & l e n g t h ) {

DirtyFrame ∗ n e x t f r a m e ;
i n t f r a m e s = d i r t y f r a m e s −>g e t L e n g t h ( ) ;
int frame type ;
i n t mja , mna ;
unsigned char ∗ p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m = NULL;

l e n g t h = ( 2 3 + f r a m e s ∗ (WORDS PER FRAME+5) + WORDS PER FRAME) ∗ 4 ;

p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m = ( unsigned char ∗ ) m a l l o c ( s i z e o f ( unsigned char ) ∗
length ) ;

i f ( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m == NULL) {
length = 0;
return p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m ;
}

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 0 ] ) , 0 x f f f f f f f f ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 4 ] ) , 0 xaa995566 ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 8 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CMD, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 1 2 ] ) ,
RCRC) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 1 6 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, FLR, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 2 0 ] ) ,
0 x26 ) ;
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writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 2 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, COR, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [ 2 8 ] ) ,
0 x00805f2d ) ;

// frame s p e c i f i c
f o r ( i n t i =0; i <f r a m e s ; i ++) {

n e x t f r a m e = d i r t y f r a m e s −>popHead ( ) ;
f r a m e t y p e = CLB ;

mja = n e x t f r a m e −>getMJA ( ) ;
mna = n e x t f r a m e −>getMNA ( ) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [32+ i ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, FAR, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [36+ i ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
( f r a m e t y p e ) | ( mja << MJA SHIFT) |
(mna << MNA SHIFT ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [40+ i ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CMD, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [44+ i ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
WCFG) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [48+ i ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, FDRI , 3 9 ) ) ;

memcpy(&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [52+ i ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
c l b f r a m e l o c a t i o n s [ mja ] [ mna ] ,
WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ) ;

n e x t f r a m e −>s e t N e x t (NULL ) ;

d e l e t e next frame ;

}

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [32+ f r a m e s ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CMD, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [36+ f r a m e s ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
RCRC) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [40+ f r a m e s ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CMD, 1 ) ) ;
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writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [44+ f r a m e s ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
LFRM) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [48+ f r a m e s ∗ 4 4 ∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, FDRI , 3 9 ) ) ;

f o r ( i n t i =0; i <WORDS PER FRAME; i ++) {
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [52+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+ i ∗ 4 ] ) ,
0 x0 ) ;
}

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [52+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CMD, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [56+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
START ) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [60+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CTL, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [64+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
PERSIST ON ) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [68+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
VirtexCommand : : Type1Command (WRITE, CMD, 1 ) ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [72+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
RCRC) ;

writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [76+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
0 x0 ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [80+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
0 x0 ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [84+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
0 x0 ) ;
writeWord (&( p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m [88+ f r a m e s ∗44∗4+WORDS PER FRAME∗ 4 ] ) ,
0 x0 ) ;

return p a r t i a l b i t s t r e a m ;

}
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Appendix B

Mapping a Configuration Memory Offset to a Physical Device
Location

It is sometimes useful to view the results of fault injection testing graphically. This is possible by plotting the sensitivity of a particular configuration memory location as an intensity value in a two-dimensional field. The two dimensional
sensitivity-intensity plot can be useful, because sensitive locations correspond to utilized locations in the FPGA. The location within the two-dimensional field for a
particular configuration memory can be computed as described in this section.
Xilinx documents information regarding the physical layout of the configuration bitstream in readily available application notes online [27]. Though this information does not provide the exact relative locations of the bits within the configuration
memory, it does so to within a good enough degree of accuracy that the resulting
image generated from such a visualization clearly resembles the utilized locations of
the FPGA design.
The configuration memory of an FPGA can be conceptually subdivided down
to the bit level. In terms of configuring the FPGA, however, the configuration memory is subdivided into frames, a group of configuration bits which spans the FPGA
vertically, when the FPGA is viewed from above, as in Figure B.1. The bits within an
individual frame are arranged in order, with the least significant at top and the most
significant at the bottom. Frames are grouped together within columns, as in Figure
B.2. The number of frames within a given column depends on the type of column
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in question. The location and size of columns is documented in Xilinx application
notes[27].

One frame
of the
configuration
bitstream

Figure B.1: One frame within the configuration bitstream of an FPGA.

By reconstructing the information regarding relative column placement, and
the relative placement of bits within a frame, a rough representation of the location
of bits within the configuration bitstream can be generated. Because the number of
columns is large compared to the number of frames within each column, the fact that
the actual order of frames within each column is unknown is not crucial, particular
when this information is used to produce a visual representation of the configuration
bitstream.
The code to generate the two dimensional array containing sensitivity information, given information about the column, frame, and bit offset within the frame,
is presented in Section B.1. This code is written in the C programming language,
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{
{

One column
of the
configuration
bitstream,
made up of
many frames

Figure B.2: One column within the configuration bitstream of an FPGA.

and is part of the fault injection tool framework. Additionally, a Matlab script is
presented in Section B.2 which allows for the two dimensional array to be viewed
graphically. Example sensitivity diagrams are presented in Appendix C.
B.1

C Code to Generate the Array of Sensitivity Information Corresponding to Physical Device Location

void w r i t e d a t a ( ) {

int c o l u m n l i s t [ 1 0 1 ] = {
98 , 100 , 96 , 94 , 92 , 90 , 88 , 86 , 84 , 82 , 80 , 78 , 76 , 74 , 72 , 70 , 68 ,
66 , 64 , 62 , 60 , 58 , 56 , 54 , 52 , 50 , 48 , 46 , 44 , 42 , 40 , 38 , 36 , 34 , 32 ,
30 , 28 , 26 , 24 , 22 , 20 , 18 , 16 , 14 , 12 , 10 , 8 , 6 , 4 , 2 , 0 , 1 , 3 , 5 , 7 , 9 ,
11 , 13 , 15 , 17 , 19 , 21 , 23 , 25 , 27 , 29 , 31 , 33 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 43 , 45 ,
47 , 49 , 51 , 53 , 55 , 57 , 59 , 61 , 63 , 65 , 67 , 69 , 71 , 73 , 75 , 77 , 79 , 81 ,
83 , 85 , 87 , 89 , 91 , 93 , 95 , 99 , 97 , } ;
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i n t frame max ;

f o r ( i n t c o l =0; c o l <101; c o l ++) {

i f ( c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] < CENTER COLS)
frame max = CENTER FRAMES;
e l s e i f ( c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] < CENTER COLS+CLB COLS)
frame max = CLB FRAMES ;
e l s e i f ( c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] < CENTER COLS+CLB COLS+IOB COLS )
frame max = IOB FRAMES ;
else
frame max = BRAM FRAMES;

f o r ( i n t f =0; f <frame max ; f ++) {
f o r ( i n t b=0;b<BITS PER FRAME ; b++) {
e r r o r l o c a t i o n c o u n t << dec <<
e r r o r s [ c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] ] [ f ] [ b ] ∗ 1 . 0 << "

";

}
e r r o r l o c a t i o n c o u n t << e n d l ;
}
}

f o r ( i n t c o l =0; c o l <101; c o l ++) {

i f ( c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] < CENTER COLS)
frame max = CENTER FRAMES;
e l s e i f ( c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] < CENTER COLS+CLB COLS)
frame max = CLB FRAMES ;
e l s e i f ( c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] < CENTER COLS+CLB COLS+IOB COLS )
frame max = IOB FRAMES ;
else
frame max = BRAM INTERCONNECT FRAMES;

f o r ( i n t f =0; f <frame max ; f ++) {
f o r ( i n t b=0;b<BITS PER FRAME ; b++) {
e r r o r l o c a t i o n c o u n t << dec <<
c o r r u p t i o n s [ c o l u m n l i s t [ c o l ] ] [ f ] [ b ] ∗ 1 . 0 << "
}
e r r o r l o c a t i o n c o u n t << e n d l ;
}
}
}
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";

B.2

Matlab Code to Import Sensitivity Information and Create a Graphic
Display
function d i s p l a y F a u l t I n j e c t i o n R e s u l t s ( f i l e N a m e )

%g i v e n a f i l e n a m e , d i s p l a y t h e two−d i m e n s i o n a l v i e w o f t h e
%s e n s i t i v i t y

r e s u l t s for the f a u l t injection t e s t that the given

%f i l e corresponds to

data = load ( f i l e N a m e ) ;
s e n s i t i v e B i t s A r r a y = data ( 1 : 4 7 7 8 , : ) ’ ;
t e s t e d B i t s A r r a y = data ( 4 7 7 9 : end , : ) ’ ;

sensitivityArray = sensitiveBitsArray ./ testedBitsArray ;

figure ;
c=colormap ;
%s e t t h e e n t r y f o r 0 p r o b a b i l i t y t o t h e c o l o r w h i t e
c (1 ,:) = [1 1 1 ] ;
colormap ( c ) ;
imagesc ( s e n s i t i v i t y A r r a y ) ;
colorbar ;
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Appendix C

Visualizing FPGA Design Sensitivity

Graphic visualizations of the sensitivities for a variety of FPGA designs tested
with the fault injection tool are presented in this Appendix. These figures were
generated as described in Appendix B.
A screen capture of each design from within FPGA Editor, a Xilinx tool for
creating low level modifications in an FPGA design, is first shown. This is followed
by the sensitivity map generated for the design through fault injection testing. It
is interesting to note that a high correlation exists between the location of utilized
FPGA components and sensitive design sections.
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Figure C.1: Screen capture of the spk design, as viewed in FPGA Editor.
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Figure C.2: Sensitivity map of the spk design, presented in Figure C.1
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Figure C.3: Screen capture of the counter design, as represented in FPGA Editor.
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Figure C.4: Sensitivity map of the counter design presented in Figure C.3.
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Figure C.5: Screen capture of the lfsr72 design, as represented in FPGA Editor.
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Figure C.6: Sensitivity map of the lfsr72 design presented in Figure C.5.
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Figure C.7: Screen capture of the vmult36 design, as represented in FPGA Editor.
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Figure C.8: Sensitivity map of the vmult36 design presented in Figure C.7.
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Figure C.9: Screen capture of the vmult72 design, as represented in FPGA Editor.
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Figure C.10: Sensitivity map of the vmult72 design presented in Figure C.9.
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Appendix D

Confidence Intervals for Radiation Testing

Probability theory can be used to generate confidence intervals on the observed
design sensitivity gathered through radiation testing. A confidence interval gives the
range over which the result of a trial of an experiment should fall into, given a desired
level of confidence. As more and more data is gathered during radiation testing, the
confidence interval tightens. A method for determining this confidence interval is
described in further detail in this section.
D.1

Probability Density Function
When radiation testing is used to gather information about the dynamic sen-

sitive cross section for a given FPGA design, each configuration upset event is like a
Bernoulli random variable. A Bernoulli random variable is used to describe a trial
with an outcome that can be classified as either a success or a failure. A Bernoulli
random variable X is described by the following probability mass function:

p(0) = P {X = 0} = 1 − r

(D.1)

p(1) = P {X = 1} = r
where p(0) = 1−r is the probability of a failure and p(1) = r is the probability
of a success[28]. In relation to determining the sensitive cross section of an FPGA
design through radiation testing, p(1) = r can be the likelihood of observing a design
failure, given that a particular configuration memory location has been upset.
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Given that the experiment described by the Bernoulli random variable X is
conducted several times, where each trial is independent of all other trials, the number
of successes (or sensitive configuration memory locations) observed for n trials is the
binomial random variable Z with parameters (n, r)[28]. The probability mass function
for this random variable is as follows:
n k
r (1 − r)n−k
k = 0, 1, . . . , n,
(D.2)
k
where p(k) is the likelihood of observing k design failures given that n config 

P (k) = p(k, n|r) =

uration memory locations have been independently upset.
When preparing for radiation testing, it is desired to estimate r, which is the
ratio of the number of sensitive bits, k, observed after testing n total bits. This is the
conditional probability of r given k and n, and is described as follows:
p(k, n|r)p(r)

p(r|k, n) = Z

1

.

(D.3)

p(k, n|r)p(r)dr

0

A reasonable uninformative prior on r might assume that p(r) = 1 over [0,1].
Intuitively, this suggests that the probability of observing a design failure given that
a sensitive bit has been upset is 1. Using this assumption along with the previous
definition for p(k, n|r), the formula for p(r|k, n) can be simplified:
!

n k
r (1 − r)n−k p(r)
k

p(r|k, n) =

!

n Z1 k
r (1 − r)n−k p(r)
k 0
(n + 1)! k
=
r (1 − r)n−k .
k!(n − k)!

D.2

(D.4)

Closed Form Estimates for the Mean and Variance
From the probability distribution function p(r|k, n) described in the previous

section, both the mean and variance can be determined:

E[r|k, n] =

Z

1

r p(r|k, n) dr =

0
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k+1
n+2

(D.5)

1

(k + 2)(k + 1)
(n + 3)(n + 2)
0
(k + 2)(k + 1) (k + 1)2
V ar[r|k, n] =
−
(n + 3)(n + 2) (n + 2)2
!
k+1 k+2 k+1
−
.
=
n+2 n+3 n+2
2

E[r |k, n] =

D.3

Z

r2 p(r|k, n) dr =

(D.6)

Generating a Confidence Interval in Preparation for Radiation Testing
In general, it is desirable to know how long to perform radiation testing in

order to gain enough data to be reasonable confident in the statistics generated from
that data. This section discusses how the equations presented in previous sections can
be applied to generating a confidence interval for the dynamic sensitive cross section
observed during radiation testing.
Before conducting radiation tests, fault injection testing should be performed.
This will provide information for the expected dynamic sensitive cross section for a
given design.
The value for n can be chosen based on the length of time that radiation
testing will be performed, and the average number of configuration upsets that occur
per unit time for a given beam flux. For example, assuming that upsets within the
configuration memory occur at a rate of 2 upsets
and a desired testing time of 6hours,
s
n can be computed as:

n=

2 upsets
3600 seconds
· 6 hours ·
= 43, 200 upsets.
second
1 hour

(D.7)

Using the dynamic sensitive cross section information obtained through fault
injection testing, the value k, or expected design failures, can be computed. Assuming
a dynamic sensitive cross section for a particular design of 15.3%, k can be computed
as

k = n · sensitivity = 43, 200 · 0.153 ≈ 6, 610 design failures.
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(D.8)

From the parameters n and k, the mean and variance for the dynamic sensitive
cross section, which are outcomes of radiation testing trials where n configuration
memory upsets occur, can be estimated:

k+1
6, 611
=
≈ 0.153
n+2
43, 202
!
k+1 k+2 k+1
−
=
n+2 n+3 n+2
!
6, 611
6, 612
6, 611
=
−
≈ 0.000003.
43, 202 43, 203 43, 202

µ =
σ2

As the parameter n of a binomial random variable grows large, the probability
distribution function can be approximated by a normal distribution. This is a result of
the central limit theorem[28], and is a useful result for computing confidence intervals.
A random variable Z which is normal distributed with µ = 0 and σ = 1 is said
to have unit normal distribution. The cumulative distribution function for the unit
normal distribution follows the form[28]
1 Z x −y2
Φ(x) = √
e 2 dy.
(D.9)
2π −∞
Confidence intervals for random variables having unit normal distribution can
be readily computed because tables for Φ(x) are readily available. A common confidence level used to compute confidence intervals is 95%. In this case of the unit
normal distribution, the range over which 95$ of random outcomes will occur is simply [a,b], where Φ(a) = 0.025 and Φ(b) = 0.975. For this particular level of confidence,
a = −2.81 and b = 2.81[28].
A useful property of normally distributed random variables can be utilized to
make computing confidence intervals based off of the equivalent confidence interval
for the unit normal distribution rather trivial. For a normal random variable X
distributed with parameters µ and σ 2 , and the random variable Z which has a unit
normal distribution[28]:

Z=

X −µ
.
σ
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(D.10)

From this property it follows that[28]:

FX (a) = P {X ≤ a}


X −µ
a−µ
= P
≤
σ 
σ

a−µ
= Φ
.
σ

(D.11)

This property becomes very useful when determining a confidence interval for
a random variable with normal distribution. For the example where µ = 0.153 and
σ 2 = 0.000003, and with a confidence level of 95%, the confidence interval can be
obtained as follows:

Φ(2.81) = 0.025


a−µ
= Φ
σ
a = −2.81σ + µ
≈ 0.1481.
Likewise:

b = 2.81σ + µ
≈ 0.1579.
Therefore, for a normally distributed random variable with µ = 0.153 and
σ 2 = 0.000003, we can be 95% sure that a given trial will result in a value lying
between 0.1481 and 0.1579.
This has direct relation to preparation for radiation testing. For a design
which has been shown through fault injection testing to have a dynamic sensitive
cross section of 15.3%, and which will be tested until n = 43, 200 upsets have been
observed, we can be 95% sure that the observed dynamic sensitive cross section will
fall between 14.81% and 15.79%.
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Table D.1: Confidence interval data for designs tested during radiation testing.
Design
Sensitivity
n
expected k
vmult36
4.308%
3,003
129.37
vmult72
15.4%
21,236
3,270.34
lfsr72
5.24%
1,069
56.016

D.4

µ
σ2
a
b
0.0434 0.0000138 0.0329 0.0538
0.154 0.0000061 0.147 0.161
0.0532 0.000047 0.0340 0.0725

Confidence Intervals for Accelerator Tests Conducted at Crocker
As already presented in Chapter 6, radiation testing was conducted at Crocker

Nuclear Laboratory on various FPGA designs. A confidence interval for the data gathered during radiation testing can be generated, which can help in deciding whether
gathered data is valid.
For the data gathered during radiation testing in November of 2002 at Crocker
Nuclear Laboratory, UC Davis, the results of a confidence interval analysis are shown
in Table D.1, assuming a confidence level of 95%.
The confidence intervals for each design can be plotted against the actual
observed design behavior during radiation testing, along with a histogram describing
expected design behavior. These figures have already been shown in Chapter 6, but
are shown here again with the confidence intervals superimposed. It is reassuring to
note that for the experiments conducted, the observed dynamic sensitive cross section
fell within the confidence interval in each case.
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Figure D.1: Visualization of the confidence interval for the vmult36 design.

101

Figure D.2: Visualization of the confidence interval for the vmult72 design.
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Figure D.3: Visualization of the confidence interval for the lfsr72 design.
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